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413 
Freedom of Artistic Creativity and 
Copyright Law: A Compatible 
Combination? 
Christophe Geiger 
Copyright was originally intended to serve creators as an engine of 
free expression, protecting them from the interference of others and from 
all risk of censorship. To this end, a balance was conceived between 
exclusive control and freedom in order to enable future creativity. Some 
uses were kept outside the control of the right owner through limitations 
to the exclusive right. However, none of the existing systems of 
limitations in the various jurisdictions was specifically designed to 
address the creative reuse of copyright protected material in the context 
of derivative works. On the contrary, when an author in his creative 
process needs to use the expression of a previous copyrighted work, he 
will have to get the authorization of the copyright owner of the original 
work. This situation can be quite cumbersome, as right owners are not 
always easy to trace. Most of all, it can lead to private censorship, as 
private entities or individuals have the potential to decide what can and 
cannot be created and block the dissemination of new works. It might 
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thus be questionable how this situation can be reconciled with either the 
copyright’s rationale of incentivizing creativity or the obligations imposed 
on States by international and regionally protected human rights such as 
freedom of expression and freedom of artistic creation. This Article will 
assess the different options available for legislators and courts to secure 
creative uses in the context of derivative works to develop a satisfying 
legal mechanism de lege ferenda, discussing in particular the possible 
objections that could result from the international and regional 
framework for both intellectual property and human rights protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Born in the Age of Enlightenment, copyright was originally intended as a 
means to secure the author’s ability to create freely, protecting him from the 
interference of others and from risks of censorship.1 Copyright was meant to be 
“the engine of free expression,” to use the words of the U.S. Supreme Court.2 To 
this end, a balance was conceived between exclusive control and freedom, with the 
overall aim of ensuring the common good: a property right was established to enable 
the author to live from his works; but at the same time, enough leverage was secured 
to allow authors to build on what existed in order to create something new. Thus, 
to enable future creativity, some uses were kept outside the control of the copyright 
owner through limitations to the exclusive right. These limitations have always 
played an essential role, alongside the exclusive right, in providing a vital and 
sustainable creative environment.3 There are many ways of drafting limitations: as 
 
1. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DROIT DU PUBLIC À L’INFORMATION, 
APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 27 (2004); Christophe Geiger, Copyright and Free Access to 
Information: For a Fair Balance of Interests in a Globalised World, 2006 EIPR 366; Paul Goldstein, 
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 983 (1970) (“Copyright is the uniquely 
legitimate offspring of censorship.”); Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in 
Historical Perspective, 10 J. Intell. Prop. L. 319, 322 (2003) (noting that “copyright has at least as long a 
history of being indifferent or hostile to freedom of expression values as it has a history of being the 
so-called ‘engine of free expression’”). 
2. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“[C]opyright’s purpose is to promote the 
creation and publication of free expression.”); Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (“[T]he Framers [of the U.S. Constitution] intended copyright itself to be the 
engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright 
supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); see also Edwin Baker, First 
Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002); Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking 
Glass: Alice and Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 
(2003); Zechariah Chafee Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (1945); 
Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 
67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment 
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment 
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of 
Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002). 
3. On their justifications, see the very interesting chapter by Pamela Samuelson, Justifications 
for Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND 
EXCEPTIONS 12 (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017). For Europe, see, for example, Christophe Geiger & 
Franciska Schönherr, Defining the Scope of Protection of Copyright in the EU: The Need to Reconsider the 
Acquis Regarding Limitations and Exceptions, in CODIFICATION OF EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW, 
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either open-ended provisions, as a catalogue of allowed exempted uses, or even as 
a combination of both.4 The first situation is found more in common law countries, 
while the second is typical in civil law jurisdictions such as France or Germany.5 
Open-ended provisions are generally considered to adapt to new situations in a 
more flexible way.6 At the same time, the results of open-ended provisions are often 
said to be less predictable,7 even if this assumption has been challenged in recent 
times.8 The U.S. Copyright Act’s “Fair Use” clause constitutes perhaps the most 
prominent example of an open-ended limitation.9 
However, none of the existing systems of limitations in the various 
jurisdictions was specifically designed to address the creative reuse of copyrighted 
material in the context of derivative works. On the contrary, when an author intends 
to create a new work based on another, and when some of the expression of a 
 
CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 133 (T.E. Synodinou ed., 2012); P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Fierce 
Creatures, Copyright Exemptions: Towards Extinction?, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN LAW, 231 (D. Vaver ed., 2006). 
4. See Christophe Geiger & Franciska Schönherr, Limitations to Copyright in the Digital Age, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU INTERNET LAW 110 (A. Savin & J. Trzaskowski eds., 2014). 
5. See, for example, BALANCING COPYRIGHT – A SURVEY OF NATIONAL APPROACHES (Reto 
M. Hilty & Silvie Nérisson eds., 2012), for further analysis on the national models of constructing 
copyright exceptions and limitations. 
6. See, e.g., Christophe Geiger, Implementing an International Instrument for Interpreting Copyright 
Limitations and Exceptions, 40 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 627, 638 (2009) 
(proposing to interpret and use the international three-step test as a Fair-use type open ended limitation 
at the international level, thus bridging civil and common law traditions); Tito Rendas, Destereotyping 
the Copyright Wars: The ‘Fair Use vs. Closed List’ Debate in the EU (2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657482 [https://perma.cc/2AAF-R3XK]; Martin Senftleben, 
Overprotection and Protection Overlaps in Intellectual Property Law – The Need for Horizontal Fair Use 
Defences, in THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 136 
(Annette Kur & Vytautas Mizaras eds., 2011). 
7. Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 559, 562 (2016) (stating that 
the fair use doctrine is “notoriously unpredictable,” in particular in the context of contemporary art 
appropriation); David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 282 (2003) (“[I]t is largely a fairy tale to conclude that the four factors 
determine resolution of concrete fair use cases.”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond 
Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 93 (2010) (calling fair use a doctrine “impossible to predict”). 
8. For suggestions that the fair use defense as it is applied by U.S. courts provides more legal 
security than it is sometimes assumed, see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright  
Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Martin  
R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe, In Search of Flexibilities 8–9 (2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1959554 [https://perma.cc/K6P6-3QAQ]; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making 
Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715 (2011); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 47 (2012); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009); Martin 
Senftleben, Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions – The Emerging EC Fair Use 
Doctrine, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 521 (2010). 
9. The U.S. Copyright Act § 107 provides that uses are fair and non-infringing depending on 
four factors: the purpose and character of the use; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount 
appropriated from the copyrighted work; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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previous work needs to be borrowed,10 he often will need the authorization of the 
copyright owner of the original work.11 If the original author then refuses to grant 
permission or asks for too high a price, the creative reuse will be hindered.12 This 
situation might resemble private censorship, as private entities or individuals have 
the potential to decide what can and cannot be created and to block the 
dissemination of new works.13 It might thus be questionable how this situation can 
be reconciled with either the copyright’s rationale of incentivizing creativity or the 
obligations imposed on States by human rights norms such as freedom of 
expression and freedom of artistic creation. In fact, freedom of art, protected as a 
separate fundamental right or as a subcategory of freedom of expression, often 
benefits from strong constitutional or conventional protection at the national or 
regional level, and in a democratic society can only be limited under very strict 
conditions.14 
When confronted with “blocking” situations, courts on either side of the 
Atlantic have tried to find workable solutions. The landmark U.S. Supreme Court 
holding in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music is illustrative.15 In that case, the flexible 
nature of the Fair Use Clause allowed the Court to rule in favor of 2 Live Crew’s 
parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman,” despite the commercial character 
of the derivative work.16 In most European countries, however, where a specific 
 
10. The technique of sampling or mash-ups in music, or appropriation uses in visual arts (so-
called “appropriation art”), are popular examples, among many others. Digital reproduction techniques 
have of course massively amplified the possibilities to creatively reuse existing works. 
11. See Luke McDonagh, Is the Creative Use of Musical Works Without a Licence Acceptable 
Under Copyright Law?, 4 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 401 (2012) (contending that 
for creative use of music, a license will be needed in most situations, as “recent case law suggests that 
even the use of a very small portion of an original work may result in infringement”). 
12. See, e.g., Ines Duhanic, Copy This Sound! The Cultural Importance of Sampling for Hip Hop 
Music in Copyright Law – A Copyright Law Analysis of the Sampling Decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, 11 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER 
TEIL [GRUR INT.] 1007, 1007–08 (2016) (“[A]t present copyright law does not properly encourage the 
practice of making creative use of appropriated art forms although the act of taking a portion, or sample, 
of something and reusing it as a method or as its own creation–sampling–has long been recognized by 
the art world. The process of sampling is not only omnipresent in the context of the contemporary art 
scene. It was the digital sampler that revolutionized the music too.”). 
13. See Anne Barron, Commodification and Cultural Form: Film Copyright Revisited, 52 NEW 
FORMATIONS 58, 80 (2004) (underlining “the spectre of censorship, for to have a property right in a 
work is to have the ability to exclude others from using that work as a mean of expression”). 
14. For further information on this issue, see Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Copyright 
on the Human Rights Trial: Redefining the Boundaries of Exclusivity Through Freedom of Expression, 45 
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 316, 321 (2014). 
15. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). For a discussion, see, infra Part 
II.A.1. 
16. See also Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006) for a case involving an artist’s 
appropriation of a copyrighted image in a collage painting. The court explored all statutory factors of 
the Fair Use Clause, weighed them together in the light of the purpose of copyright and came to the 
conclusion that copyright law’s goal of “promoting the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts” would 
be better served by allowing the use than by preventing it. On the issue of appropriation art and 
copyright, see Judith Bresler, Begged, Borrowed or Stolen: Whose Art is it Anyway? An Alternative 
Solution of Fine Art Licensing, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 15, 20 (2003); William M. Landes, 
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limitation for creative use is lacking, and borrowing from an existing work is only 
allowed in a very limited way through existing and narrowly defined limitations, the 
situation is more complicated. There, judges often have to use external legal 
mechanisms such as competition law or fundamental rights to avoid the deterring 
effects of exclusivity.17 In fact, in a number of cases, several courts in Europe have 
directly applied the fundamental right to free artistic expression, protected under 
the general ambit of the right to freedom of expression of Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, to allow the creative reuse of a protected 
work.18 In the same spirit, some scholars in the United States have advocated to 
limit copyright based on the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.19 However, 
as it might not be ideal to rely on rules from outside the intellectual property system 
to reach the goals of copyright law, it could be preferable to solve these problems 
by an appropriate revision of the legislative framework. For this reason, there have 
been vibrant discussions in recent times among European scholars on how to 
“flexibilize” existing limitations, to establish an open clause such as fair use in the 
 
Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 
10 (2000). However, in other similar cases, the use was considered unfair. For further detail on this 
discussion, see infra Part II.A.1. 
17. On these developments, see Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? 
The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in Europe, 37 INT’L. REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 371 (2006), reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 314 
(Laurence R. Helfer ed., 2013); Christophe Geiger, Copyright’s Fundamental Rights Dimension at EU 
Level, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT 27, 28–29, 31 (Estelle Derclaye 
ed., 2009); Christophe Geiger, Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 115 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 3d ed. 2015). 
18. See the numerous examples given by Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of Expression and the Right 
to Information: Implications for Copyright, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 331, 332–33 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015) [hereinafter RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK]. See also infra Part II. 
19. See Thomas F. Cotter, Transformative Use and Cognizable Harm, 12 VAND. J. ENT. &  
TECH. L. 701, 746 (2010) (“[I]f the right to prepare derivative works is sufficiently problematic from 
the standpoint of freedom of speech, perhaps a more direct approach would be to limit the right on 
First Amendment grounds rather than indirectly through the fair use doctrine.”); Stephen Fraser, The 
Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and its Impact on the Internet, 16 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 52 (1998) (“Protection of the freedom of speech from overzealous courts, 
Congress, and copyright holders must be assured. An independent First Amendment privilege outside 
the copyright fair use doctrine is a necessary step in that direction.”). 
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European Union,20 or even to implement a specific limitation for “user-generated 
content,”21 as was recently done in Canada.22 
The purpose of this Article is to assess the different options available for 
legislators and courts, evaluate the obligations resulting from human and 
fundamental rights, and develop, using a comparative analysis, a satisfying legal 
mechanism for creative uses in the context of derivative works, thus making 
copyright fully compatible with the human right to free artistic creativity. 
I. FREEDOM OF ARTISTIC CREATIVITY AND COPYRIGHT LAW: A TENSE 
RELATIONSHIP 
Part I of this Article problematizes the relationship between the human right 
to freedom of artistic creativity and the legislative and theoretical framework that 
makes up the copyright system. Although the motivation behind copyright and 
freedom of artistic creativity can be reconciled, this balance is challenged by the 
unique test to copyright posed by derivative works and appropriation art. Parts II 
and III of this Article seek to address how stability may be maintained or full 
compatibility can be achieved. 
A. Freedom of Artistic Creativity: A Human Right Largely Recognized and  
Widely Protected 
Freedom of artistic creativity is a fundamental right protected in international 
and regional human rights instruments and in national constitutions.23 Major 
sources of international law across the board recognize freedom of artistic creativity 
explicitly, or implicitly, as an inherent element of the right to freedom of expression. 
 
20. See, e.g., Christophe Geiger, Flexibilising Copyright – Remedies to the Privatisation of 
Information by Copyright Law, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 178 (2008); Christophe 
Geiger et al., Limitations and Exceptions as Key Elements of the Legal Framework for Copyright in  
the European Union – Opinion of the European Copyright Society on the Judgment of the CJEU in Case  
C-201/13 Deckmyn, 46 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 93 (2015); P. Bernt 
Hugenholtz, Flexible Copyright: Can EU Author’s Right Accommodate Fair Use?, in NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN EU AND INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 417, 418–19 (Irini A. Stamatoudi 
ed., 2016) [hereinafter NEW DEVELOPMENTS]; Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 8; Martin 
Senftleben, Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions – The Emerging EC Fair Use 
Doctrine, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 521, 522, 524 (2010); Martin Senftleben, The Perfect Match – 
Civil Law Judges and Open-Ended Fair Use Provisions, 33 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 231 (2017). 
21. See, e.g., Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, 19–20, COM (2009) 532 final (Oct. 19, 2009). 
22. Section 29.21 (Non-Commercial User-generated Content) of the Canadian Copyright 
Modernization Act (S.C. 2012, c. 20). 
23. For a discussion of the core human rights values expressed in the right to freedom of artistic 
creativity, see, for example, L.P. Chambers, Moral Freedom and Artistic Creativity, 42 INT’L J. ETHICS 
163 (1932) (discussing the relationship between freedom of ethic and self-determination and freedom 
of expression); I.J. Oosthuizen & C.J. Russo, A Constitutionalised Perspective of Freedom of Artistic 
Expression, 23 S. AFR. J. EDUC. 260 (2001) (problematizing the definition and scope of the freedom of 
artistic expression and defining its role in the creation of a democratic society, as applied specifically to 
South Africa). See also Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights), Report of the 
Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, Farida Shaheed: The Right to Freedom of Artistic 
Expression and Creativity, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/34 (Mar. 14, 2013). 
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In these instruments, the individual right to express ideas creatively is often 
irrevocably linked with the right to receive them. In Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to freedom of creativity 
is formulated as: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information . . . in the form of art, 
or through any other media of his choice.”24 Likewise, Article 13(1) of the American 
Convention of Human Rights is expressed in largely the same terms.25 The link 
between expression and reception is even present in more tailored human rights 
frameworks, which explicitly articulate the right as it applies to their limited central 
subject. Such is the case with Articles 1326 and 3127 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child. 
While the ICCPR, the American Convention, and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child focus on the right inherent to the individual, in other explicit 
iterations, rather than highlighting the individual claim, a state mandate is created.28 
For example, Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) puts the onus on the state to “undertake to respect the 
freedom indispensable for . . . creative activity.”29 
An implicit right to freedom of artistic creativity is derived through judicial 
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights’s (ECHR) Article 
10,30 which protects the right to freedom of expression.31 Expanding on Article 10’s 
imperative in its decision in Alınak v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) emphasized the civic importance of the freedom of artistic creativity and 
the corresponding duty imposed on European states to uphold and respect it.32  
 
 
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 16, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (emphasis added). 
25. American Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 
(“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression . . . in the form of art . . . .”). 
26. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 13, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (“The child 
shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds . . . [including] in the form of art . . . .”). 
27. Id. art. 31 (“States Parties shall respect and promote the right of the child to participate fully 
in cultural and artistic life and shall encourage the provision of appropriate and equal opportunities for 
cultural, artistic, recreational and leisure activity.”). 
28. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
29. Id. 
30. European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) art. 10 (“Everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression . . . .”). 
31. See Alınak v. Turkey, no. 40287/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); Karataş v. Turkey, no. 23168/94, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999); Müller and Others v. Switzerland, no. 10737/84, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988) (stating that 
art. 10 “includes freedom of artistic expression – notably within freedom to receive and impart 
information and ideas . . . .”). On these cases, see Christophe Geiger and Elena Izyumenko, Intellectual 
Property Before the European Court of Human Rights (Ctr. for Int’l Intellectual Prop. Studies,  
Research Paper No. 2018-01, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3116752 
[https://perma.cc/MT37-ABWQ]. 
32. Karataş v. Turkey, no. 23168/94. 
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According to the court: 
[f ]reedom of artistic expression . . . affords the opportunity to take part in 
the public exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas 
of all kinds . . . . Those who create, perform, distribute or exhibit works of 
art contribute to the exchange of ideas and opinions which is essential for 
a democratic society. Hence there is an obligation on the State not to 
encroach unduly on the author’s freedom of expression.33 
In other cases, the ECtHR has explicitly enlarged the onus on the state to 
include a positive obligation to protect Article 10 rights where there is a substantial 
public interest involved.34 The right to freedom of artistic creativity is also often 
conceived as inextricable from the right to enjoy the arts and the right to take part 
in cultural life,35 which is most notably enshrined in Article 27 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR)36 and Article 15 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),37 as well as in other 
important regional human rights instruments.38 
Recognition of the right to freedom of artistic creativity in domestic legal 
systems has taken myriad forms. In national constitutions, as with international and 
regional instruments, freedom of artistic creativity is often located within the 
strongly-protected right to freedom of expression. For example, Article 5 of the 
German Basic Law contains a special paragraph linking the right to freedom of 
expression with the right to freely develop the arts and sciences.39 The Swedish 
Fundamental Law, which is one of the four laws making up the Swedish 
 
33. Id. 
34. See Appleby v. UK, no. 44306/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003). 
35. See Christophe Geiger, Taking the Right to Culture Seriously: Time to Rethink Copyright Law, 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO SCIENCE AND CULTURE: CONVERGENCE OR 
CONFLICT? 84, 88 (C. Geiger ed., 2016) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]; Caterina Sganga, 
Right to Culture and Copyright: Participation and Access, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 
560, 561–62; Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 1 WIS. L. REV. 121, 122, 131, 156, 169 (2010); 
Lea Shaver & Caterina Sganga, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: On Copyright and Human Rights, 
27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 637, 652–54 (2010). 
36. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). For further 
analysis of Article 27 UDHR, see, inter alia, ELSA STAMATOPOULOU, CULTURAL RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ARTICLE 27 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
BEYOND 110 (2007). 
37. Article 15(1) ICESCR adopts the wording of the UDHR almost verbatim. See Shaheed,  
supra note 23 (situating art. 27 of the UNDHR with other explicit and implicit articulations of the right 
to freedom of artistic expression). See also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 35, at 19,  
http://www.ceipi.edu/fileadmin/upload/DUN/CEIPI/Documents/Publications_CEIPI___ 
ICTSD/CEIPI-ICTSD_no_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7WB-KE4J]. See especially the introduction 
by the Special Rapporteur Farida Shaheed and the contributions of Lea Shaver, Rebecca Giblin, and 
Christophe Geiger. 
38. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 17; Arab Charter of Human 
Rights art. 36; EU Charter of Fundamental Rights art. 13. 
39. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany art. 5: “(1) Every person shall have the right 
freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures, and to inform himself 
without hindrance from generally accessible sources. . . . (3) Arts and sciences, research and teaching 
shall be free . . . .” 
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Constitution, explicitly includes the freedom of artistic creation as part of the key 
purposes of freedom of expression: “The purpose of freedom of expression under 
this Fundamental Law is to secure the free exchange of opinion, free and 
comprehensive information, and freedom of artistic creation. . . .”40 Constitutions 
of certain other countries recognize the freedom of artistic expression within the 
ambit of the right to science and culture.41 
In U.S. case law, freedom of artistic creativity is covered by the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,42 although the U.S. Supreme Court has never 
considered this freedom as a distinct category akin to political or commercial 
speech; it rather addresses the various forms of art in their relation to the First 
Amendment on a contextual basis.43 In considering, for example, state-based 
regulation of obscene art and its threat to free speech, the Supreme Court has 
articulated the need to protect the “ideal of creativity” and the liberty to explore 
creatively that is its precondition.44 According to the Court, freedom of artistic 
 
40. Swedish Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression chapter 1, art. 1. 
41. See, e.g., Magyarország Alaptörvénye [Constitution] (Hung.) art. X(1) (“Hungary shall ensure 
the freedom of scientific research and artistic creation . . . .”); Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
[Constitution] art. 73 (Pol.) (“The freedom of artistic creation and scientific research as well as 
dissemination of the fruits thereof, the freedom to teach and to enjoy the products of culture, shall be 
ensured to everyone.”). For an example of the stand-alone provision on freedom of artistic expression 
guaranteed independently from either the freedom of expression as such or the freedom of science and 
culture, see Bundesverfassung [BV] [Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 21 (Switz.) (“Freedom 
of artistic expression is guaranteed.”). On the various options to protect IP at the constitutional level, 
see for example, Christophe Geiger, Implementing Intellectual Property Provisions in Human Rights 
Instruments: Towards a New Social Contract for the Protection of Intangibles, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK, 
supra note 18, at 661, 666–67. 
42. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (including motion pictures 
within the ambit of the First Amendment); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(explaining the First Amendment interest for both authors and audiences in balancing the freedom of 
artistic expression with the statutory limitations of the Lanham Act); Sefick v. City of Chicago, 485 F. 
Supp. 644, 645, 653 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (holding that sculptures satirizing the then-mayor of Chicago and 
his wife fell within the protection of the First Amendment). 
43. Interestingly, this is a quite different position from that adopted in Europe where the 
ECtHR and many national courts explicitly place artistic expression in a separate category. For further 
information on this, see, for example, Raman Maroz, The Freedom of Artistic Expression in the 
Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and Federal Constitutional Court of Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 341, 346 (2017) (“[W]hile the freedom of artistic 
creativity has indeed received constitutional protection, the U.S. Supreme Court has neither 
distinguished artistic freedom from other forms of expression nor given any meaning to the term ‘art 
speech.’ Nor has the U.S. Supreme Court explained why artistic expression falls within the ambit of the 
First Amendment or why it is important for social development. In this regard, the approach of the 
U.S. Supreme Court differs strikingly from the position of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 
which examined these issues in detail.”). For more on the place accorded to artistic expression among 
the types of speech protected by the First Amendment, see Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression 
and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime and the First Amendment, WIS. L. REV. 221,  
222 (1987); George Vetter & Christopher C. Roche, The First Amendment and the Artist – Part I,  
R.I.B. J., Mar. 1996, at 7; George Vetter & Christopher C. Roche, The First Amendment and the Artist 
- Part II, R.I.B. J., Apr. 1996, at 9. 
44. See A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney  
Gen. of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 439 (1966). 
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creativity is an element of the respect for freedom of self-expression, one of the 
core values of the First Amendment, and American democracy in general.45 
B. Freedom of Artistic Creativity and Copyright Law: Two Rights with Similar Goals 
Born from the same respect for the act of creation as the right to free creative 
expression, copyright law was originally meant to be, in the words of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, “the engine of free expression.”46 Indeed, unchecked private 
interests and rampant censorship in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe 
created the background conditions for the advent of copyright, which was touted 
as a solution to the problem of limitations on creative expression.47 In this period, 
the English Stationers’ Guild maintained a registry of the exclusive printing rights 
of stationers for specific books, thus ensuring their monopoly over the books they 
printed.48 The registry also furthered the aims of censorship as it allowed authorities 
to easily monitor materials published and keep a watchful eye out for the printing 
of seditious material, which was considered a danger to the state.49 Simultaneously, 
the stationers were allowed to keep their monopolies in exchange for complying 
with the laws.50 
 
45. Id. 
46. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). For a very deep 
and interesting historical analysis, see GIANCARLO FROSIO, RECONCILING COPYRIGHT WITH 
CUMULATIVE CREATIVITY: THE THIRD PARADIGM (2018) (examining the long history of creativity, 
from cave art to digital remix, in order to demonstrate a consistent disparity between the traditional 
cumulative mechanics of creativity and modern copyright policies). 
47. See GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT & THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2d ed. 2002); OF AUTHORS 
AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994) [hereinafter 
OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS]. 
48. See CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS’ COMPANY: A HISTORY, 1403–1959, at 33 
(1977); CYNDIA S. CLEGG, PRESS CENSORSHIP IN JACOBEAN ENGLAND 1–2 (2001); CYNDIA  
S. CLEGG, PRESS CENSORSHIP IN ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND 3–5 (1997); DAVIES, supra note 47, at 10 
(“The royal interest in granting the monopoly was not to provide protection to the stationers’ property 
rights but to satisfy the desire of the crown for an effective control over the publishing trade and the 
press so as to outlaw the publishing of seditious and heretical books.”); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, 
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 114–43 (1968); DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE 335–38 (Niccolò 
Abriani, Gastone Cottino & Marco Ricolfi eds., 2001). On the Statute of Anne and its history, see 
RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE MOVEMENT OF 
COPYRIGHT LAW IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BRITAIN (1695–1775), at 2–3 (2004); MARK ROSE, 
AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 12–13, 15, 24 (1993); William Cornish, 
The Statute of Anne 1709–10: Its Historical Setting, in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT: THREE HUNDRED YEARS 
SINCE THE STATUTE OF ANNE, FROM 1709 TO CYBERSPACE 14, 17 (Lionel Bently, Uma Suthersanen 
& Paul Torremans eds., 2010) [hereinafter GLOBAL COPYRIGHT] Mark Rose, The Public Sphere and the 
Emergence of Copyright: Areopagitica, the Stationers’ Company, and the Statute of Anne, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 123, 136, 139, 143 (2009). 
49. DAVIES, supra note 47, at 10; Pamela Samuelson, Copyright, Commodification,  
and Censorship: Past as Prologue—But to What Future? (1999) (unpublished manuscript),  
http://works.bepress.com/pamela_samuelson/228/ [https://perma.cc/7RTW-8LS2]. 
50. DAVIES, supra note 49, at 10. 
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By the early eighteenth century, however, attitudes towards the restriction of 
information and ideas had changed.51 Enlightenment notions about the need for 
intellectual independence and free debate were more widely ascribed throughout 
Europe, challenging the legitimacy of monarchic censorship and seeking a balance 
of interests among the author, the state, and the public.52 In response, the British 
Parliament passed the Statute of Anne “for the encouragement of learning.”53 The 
Statute was the first codification of modern, public copyright regulations,54 and the 
first recorded articulation of the utilitarian theory of intellectual property law: that 
the enforcement of a limited monopoly through regulation of use could incentivize 
creation.55 In this hugely influential affirmation of copyright,56 the preeminent 
imperative for regulation seemed to have focused on the maximization of public 
good, and less on the protection of an individual right.57 However, the liberty to 
 
51. For further detail, see Christophe Geiger, The Influence (Past and Present) of the Statute of 
Anne in France, in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 48, at 122, 129 (“[A] common point between Great 
Britain and France is linked to the eighteenth century, the advent of the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment and the will to circumvent Royal censorship. In fact, the Enlightenment philosophers, 
who gradually became ardent defenders of authors’ rights over their works, mostly conceived copyright 
as a guarantee for freedom of expression. To them, granting copyright to authors was allowing the 
dissemination of ideas and knowledge, the author being endowed with an educational mission, in charge 
of ‘enlightening’ the population. However, the granting of royal privileges was often preceded by a 
control of the works’ content.”). 
52. See, e.g., DAVIES, supra note 47, at 34; ALAIN STROWEL, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET COPYRIGHT, 
DIVERGENCES ET CONVERGENCES (1993); Gillian Davies, The Convergence of Copyright and Authors 
Rights - Reality or Chimera?, 26 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 964 (1995); Geiger, 
supra note 1, at 367; Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary 
France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990); Alain Strowel, Convergences Entre Droit D’auteur et 
Copyright dans la Société de L’information, in SCHUTZ VON KULTUR UND GEISTIGEM EIGENTUM IN 
DER INFORMATIONSGESELLSCHAFT 59 (1998); Alain Strowel, Droit D’auteur and Copyright: Between 
History and Nature, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS, supra note 47, at 235. 
53. RONAN DEAZLEY, Commentary on the Statute of Anne 1710, in PRIMARY SOURCES  
ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900), (Lionel Bently & Martin Kretschmer eds., 2008),  
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_uk_1710 
[https://perma.cc/UP2F-DHJY]. Similarly, the preamble of the Statute of Anne emphasizes the need 
“for the encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful books.” Id. According to Ronan 
Deazley, this is the central element of the 1710 law, which primarily seeks to encourage the production 
and dissemination of new ideas by way of granting either the author or the publisher a legal monopoly, 
with this being indirectly beneficial for the public and the society as a whole. Id. 
54. Paul Edward Geller, International Copyright: The Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 2[1][b] (Lionel Bently ed., 2016). 
55. H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, The Untold Story of the First Copyright Suit Under the Statute 
of Anne in 1710, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247, 1248–49 (2010). 
56. See Geiger, supra note 51. 
57. See Orit Fishman Afori, Human Rights and Copyright: The Introduction of Natural Law 
Considerations into American Copyright Law, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 497, 507 
(2004). Although it is true that the Statute of Anne mentions the author, some scholars have 
convincingly demonstrated that it was mostly rhetoric. See BLAGDEN, supra note 48, at 153–75 (1977). 
For whom the championing of the author was purely motivated by the circumstances and a desire to 
cut short the Stationers company’s monopoly, see PATTERSON, supra note 48, at 147 (“Emphasis on 
the author in the Statute of Anne implying that the statutory copyright was an author’s copyright was 
more a matter of form than of substance. The monopolies at which the statute was aimed were too 
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create freely without any control of the ruler and to spread new ideas within the 
society, as a manifestation of Enlightenment thinking and a correlative element to 
the freedom of expression,58 have been in the regulatory zeitgeist for centuries.59 
This utilitarian mode of justification has persisted across history. The spirit of 
the Statute of Anne and of much eighteenth century copyright legislation in Europe 
is still reflected worldwide. The “Copyright Clause” embedded within the U.S. Bill 
of Rights is one such adaptation, as the clause purports “[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”60 
Yet utilitarianism is not the sole justification for national and international 
copyright systems. Copyright theory has expanded to include a formulation of 
ownership rights and personality interests propagated by the personality theorists 
of the nineteenth century, and often concretized in the form of the protection of 
the author’s economic interests and his “moral rights.”61 These approaches, often 
attributed to Hegel, Locke, or Kant,62 imbue creators with exclusive authorship 
rights on the basis of their natural legal right to property, often understood as an 
extension of an individual’s labor or existential will, the exercise of which 
individuates private property from a property “commons” (now formulated in the 
IP field as the “public domain”).63 The central tenet of these theories is that 
ownership is established through the dynamic relationship between the personality 
and the object, with the personality acting upon or through the object. In this 
 
long established to be attacked without some basis change. The most logical and natural basis for the 
changes was the author . . . . [T]he author was used primarily as a weapon against monopoly.”). 
58. See Christophe Geiger, Author’s Right, Copyright and the Public’s Right to Information, in 5 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 24 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007) [hereinafter NEW 
DIRECTIONS] (problematizing the relationship between the author and the recipient of information as 
it is enshrined in the “freedom of communication” and the freedom of expression); Lyman Ray 
Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 365, 379 (2000). 
59. Geiger, supra note 1, at 367. 
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
61. See Paul E. Geller, Must Copyright Be For Ever Caught Between Marketplace and Authorship 
Norms, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS, supra note 47, at 167 (“As the Enlightenment gave way to 
Romanticism, there was an increasing recognition that genius creatively accelerated the progress of the 
mind by its unexpected but fruitful insights. . . . Romantic critics began to consider the individually 
creative subject in terms of a new vision, which was to find its way into copyright thought.”); Cyril  
P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 412 (2006). On the emergence of 
the discourse about the genius, see ROSE, supra note 48, at 1; MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, 
ART, AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS (1994); Giancarlo Frosio, 
Rediscovering Cumulative Creativity from the Oral Formulaic Tradition to Digital Remix: Can I Get a 
Witness?, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 341, 370–76 (2014); Martha Woodmansee, The 
Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author’, 17 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984). 
62. See, e.g., GEORG FRIEDRICH WILHELM HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 69 
(Thomas M. Knox trans., Clarendon Press 1967) (1821); IMMANUEL KANT, Kritik der Urteilskraft, in 
KANT’S KRITIK OF JUDGMENT § 46 ( J.H. Bernard trans., Macmillan and Co. 1892) (1790); JOHN 
LOCKE, Two Treatises of Government, in THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE § 27 (1727); see also Justin 
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 287–331 (1988). 
63. Shaheed, supra note 23. 
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subject-object interaction, the individual establishes an existential claim to the object 
which, in a market-based society, manifests as a legally cognizable property right.64 
In the case of intellectual property, the creative expression constitutes the object. 
While the applicability of personality theory in the IP field is contested, and Locke’s 
labor hypothesis did not explicitly encompass intangible objects in its original 
formulation,65 so called “author rights” systems in continental Europe explicitly 
protect the remuneration interest of creators for the use of their works by granting 
them special contractual protections against buyouts from publishers or 
participation in the remuneration generated by levies/statutory licenses.66 
However, it might still be questionable how copyright’s rationales can be 
reconciled with the obligations imposed on States by human rights, such as freedom 
of artistic creation. One reason for this is that ostensibly utilitarianism’s 
maximization of creation manifests through the grant of exclusive economic rights 
in allowing the rightsholder to control the use of his work, without explicitly 
mandating a counterbalancing individual right of the freedom to create, and moral 
rights seem to focus on protecting the interests of the initial author. Nevertheless, 
the central aims of the freedom of artistic creativity and copyright legislation are not 
irreconcilable, and international and state judiciaries in conjunction with a variety of 
IP scholars have articulated theories of cohesion between the two systems of rights. 
One theory of rapprochement describes a creative right as a “positive 
dimension” of the freedom of expression, with copyright—which encompasses the 
moral and economic rights of the creator—as an inherent element of creativity.67 
Another attempt at reconciliation looks to the case law of the ECtHR interpreting 
Article 10 of the Convention, particularly the Austrian case Vereinigung Bildender 
Kunstler v. Austria that balances the individual right to privacy of an Austrian 
politician with the artist who used his image’s right to freedom of expression.68 In 
that case, and others like it, the European and national courts attempt to bridge the 
rights of the public with the rights of the creator through an analysis of artistic 
contribution to “public debate” and the right of the public to be informed.69 The 
interests of the public, arguably, guarantee an authorial right to free creation where 
there is a public function to the work, one which would be equally valid where a 
 
64. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 97–98 (2011). 
65. See Letter from John Locke to Edward Clarke ( January 2, 1692(-3)), in THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE AND EDWARD CLARKE 366–68 (B. Rand ed., 1927); see also 
Justin Hughes, Locke’s 1694 Memorandum (and More Incomplete Copyright Historiographies), 27 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 555 (2010); Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright 
Debates and the Rhetoric of the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 84–85 (2003). The 
extension of Locke’s arguments to cover intellectual property was due to William Blackstone. See 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 405 (1766). 
66. On the role of a “remuneration-based” system, see infra Part III. 
67. André Kévérer, Authors Rights Are Human Rights, 32 COPYRIGHT BULL. 18, 20 (1998). 
68. Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria, App. No. 68354/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), § 26. 
69. Id. 
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property right is implicated in a balance of individual rights; copyright and freedom 
of artistic expression operate hand in hand.70 
In perhaps the most explicit marriage of the two doctrines, American 
copyright case law has definitively mandated that the First Amendment and the 
Copyright Clause work together to promote freedom of artistic creativity. As 
formulated by the Supreme Court, the role of the Copyright Clause, in promoting 
the utilitarian notion of the public good, and the role of the First Amendment, in 
maintaining an individual right of expression, is to assure “that [the] government 
throws up no obstacle to [the] dissemination [of creative content].”71 In fact, the 
Court maintains that the copyright system has developed to allow the balancing of 
both: to that end, the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use exception exist to 
ensure that the limitations of the copyright system are compatible with the free 
dissemination demands of the First Amendment, which includes the promotion of 
the freedom of artistic expression.72 
Having established that the end goals of copyright and the freedom of artistic 
creativity are not irreconcilable, a delicate balance has been achieved within the 
system to allow creative freedom while maintaining some notion of exclusive 
control; copyright simultaneously enables authors to make a living from their 
creations while allowing them to build on preexisting material to create new works 
of authorship. Limitations, such as open-ended provisions, a catalogue of allowed 
exempted uses, or a combination of both, are essential to achieving this essential 
balance and ensuring future creativity. In working alongside the exclusive right, 
therefore, limitations play an essential role in fostering a creative environment.73 
C. Freedom of Artistic Creativity and Copyright Law: Two Rights in Conflict When it 
Comes to the Creative Reuse of Protected Works 
As noted, no existing system of limitations in various jurisdictions was 
specifically designed to address the creative reuse of copyrighted material in the 
context of derivative works. At present, when one wants to create a derivative work 
or a dependent creation (that is, a new work incorporating a creative reuse of an 
 
70. Agata Dimmich, Copyright as a Human Right Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, in KNOWRIGHT 2008: KNOWLEDGE RIGHTS – LEGAL, SOCIETAL AND RELATED 
TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS 23–24 ( Jens Gaster, Erich Schweighofer & Peter Sint eds., 2008); Helle 
Porsdam, On European Narratives of Human Rights and Their Possible Implications for Copyright, in 6 
NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 58, at 346–49. 
71. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 244 (2003). 
72. Id.; see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 876–77 (2012) (describing fair use as a built-in 
First Amendment consideration in copyright law). As it was often stated by scholars, “fair use polices 
the boundary between free speech and copyright’s control of creative expression. The defense succeeds 
when the new creator can show that his use of the copyrighted work in essence advances the goals of 
copyright itself: ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts.’” Adler, supra note 7; see, e.g., David 
L. Lange, Risa J. Weaver & Shiveh Roxana Reed, Golan V. Holder: Copyright in the Image of the First 
Amendment, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 83 (2011). 
73. See Christophe Geiger, Promoting Creativity Through Copyright Limitations: Reflections on the 
Concept of Exclusivity in Copyright Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515 (2010). 
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existing protected work), no limitation for creative use is available. On the contrary, 
very limited options exist, such as the already existing limitations to copyright law. 
Most of the time, in order to comply with the law, a creator of a derivative work 
must clear rights associated with the use of the source material. 
This requirement seems to be mandated by international law: Article 2.3 of the 
Berne Convention states that “translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and 
other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works 
without prejudice to the copyright in the original work.”74 Although the article offers 
protection to derivative works as independent, separable artistic creations, it 
requires the consent of the author of the original work where that work is not in 
the public domain.75 To temper these strict demands, some scholarly interpretations 
of Article 2.3 suggest the existence of a caveat; there could be a potential exception 
to the consent requirement in the event of a historically accepted transformative 
(and otherwise lawfully executed) use, such as a parody or a burlesque.76 Such 
interpretations make sense since it cannot be in the spirit of the Berne Convention 
to submit widely accepted and permitted uses such as parodies to the authorization 
of the initial author.77 Moreover, submitting these uses to the exclusive right would 
be in open contradiction with international obligations related to freedom of 
expression, to which the Member States of Berne are also parties.78 Furthermore, 
the status of appropriation art, which takes directly from the original work and 
expresses creative thought primarily through contextualization, remains ambiguous 
as “other alterations” have yet to be fully defined by the courts.79 
The need for greater clarity on this issue cannot be overstated. Scholars of 
artistic development have long taken note of the growing trend, shared across the 
 
74. Id. (emphasis added). Many states have adopted the text of the Convention, or similar 
language, in their national legislation. 
75. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 208 (3d  
ed. 2012). 
76. SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 484 (2d ed. 2006). 
77. As Goldstein and Hugenholtz note, “[p]arody, though nowhere expressly exonerated in the 
Berne text, is widely accepted across the Berne Union as a permitted use . . . .” GOLDSTEIN & 
HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 75, at 393. They also admit that one of the hardest questions raised by 
parodies “[is] the point at which parody leaves off and a derivative work begins,” citing borderline cases 
in national decisions. Id. 
78. This interpretation has to be clarified and specified, however. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHT TREATIES ADMINISTERED BY WIPO 
AND GLOSSARY OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS TERMS para. BC-2.44, at 28–29 (2003),  
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/891/wipo_pub_891.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
77NR-FL67]. 
79. Id. para. BC-2.48, at 29 (“What definitely needs interpretation . . . is the meaning of ‘other 
alterations of a literary or artistic work.’ It goes without saying that it cannot mean any alterations but 
only those which result in new original elements in relation to the previous unaltered form of the work. 
It is, in fact, not easy to find obvious examples for this subcategory of derivative works. Caricatures 
and parodies are mentioned sometimes (to the extent that they may not be characterized as adaptations) 
but the transformation of a computer program into another computer ‘language’ or from source code 
into object code . . . may also be included in this broader sub-category.”). 
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generic and formalistic spectrum of artistic creation, towards a contemporary 
aesthetic that embraces pastiche: “appropriation designed to be recognizable.”80 
While art has incorporated referential elements practically since its inception, and 
postmodernism ushered in an age in which reference and meaning became 
inextricable, modern artwork has, arguably, embraced appropriation on an even 
larger scale. Music represents a field with an established history of appropriation 
developed first through the use of “sampling” and then the invention of the 
“remix” and “mashup.”81 It is a history that spans the early intermixture of various 
strains of jazz music,82 the incorporation of 60s funk beats into the disco tunes of 
the 70s,83 the experimentation by Jamaican DJ’s and studio engineers with “dub” in 
the late 60s and 70s in mixing live disparate sounds into a single work, mostly on 
instrumental versions of existing tracks,84 and the reliance of hip hop producers on 
innovative uses of copyrighted soul recordings to create completely new works85 
such as the WuTang Clan’s 90s sampling of the 1967 Charmels to create 
C.R.E.A.M.,86 Danger Mouse’s 2006 mashup of Jay-Z’s set to the Beatles’ White 
 
80. Aaron Gervais, Why Pastiche Has Taken Over Music, NEW MUSIC BOX (Feb. 24, 2016), 
http://www.newmusicbox.org/articles/why-pastiche-has-taken-over-music/ [https://perma.cc/ 
NY2J-FWU8]. 
81. For a history of musical sampling (as well as its copyright implications), see JAMES BOYLE, 
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 129–54 (2008); KEMBREW 
MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: RESISTANCE AND REPRESSION IN THE AGE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 66 (2007); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical 
Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006); Duhanic, supra note 12, at 1007 
(“No sampling, no Hip Hop. And that would be unacceptable for a democratic society governed by the 
rule of law and the resulting freedom for artists to express themselves artistically.”); David Sanjek, 
“Don’t Have to DJ No More”: Sampling and the “Autonomous” Creator, 10 CARDOZO ARTS &  
ENT. L.J. 607 (1992); Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital Sampling, Intermediate Copying, Fair 
Use, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 271 (1996); compare RICHARD L. SCHUR, PARODIES OF OWNERSHIP: HIP-
HOP AESTHETICS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 46–49 (2009); Kevin J. Greene, “Copynorms,” 
Black Cultural Production, and the Debate over African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 1179, 1186 (2008); Kevin J. Greene, What the Treatment of African American Artists Can 
Teach About Copyright Law, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES 
AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 385, 389–90 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007); Perry A. Hall, African-
American Music: Dynamics of Appropriation and Innovation, in BORROWED POWER: ESSAYS ON 
CULTURAL APPROPRIATION 31 (Bruce Ziff & Pratima V. Rao eds., 1997). 
82. Steve Stein, Steinski Gives a Sampling History Lesson, NPR (Oct. 22, 2008),  
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93844583 [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20170422200527/http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93844583]. 
83. Thomas Kennedy, AKAI MPC 2000/The History of Sampling, JOYFUL NOISE (Sept. 11, 
2013), https://www.joyfulnoiserecordings.com/blogs/news/31858113-akai-mpc-2000-the-history-
of-sampling [https://perma.cc/X2YR-DUK6]. 
84. Szymanski, supra note 81, at 277. 
85. See, e.g., Tonya M. Evans, Sampling, Looping, and Mashing . . . Oh My! How Hip Hop Music Is 
Scratching More Than the Surface of Copyright Law, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 843 
(2011). 
86. Oliver Wang, ‘C.R.E.A.M.’: The Story of a Sample, NPR (Apr. 22, 2009),  
http://www.npr.org/2011/01/04/103319951/c-r-e-a-m-the-story-of-a-sample [https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20171010030420/http://www.npr.org:80/2011/01/04/103319951/c-r-e-a-m-the-story-of-a-
sample]; see also Duhanic, supra note 12 (discussing the issue of sampling in hip hop music from a 
copyright perspective). 
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Album culminating into the Grey Album,87 and the entire culture of DJ-driven 
electronic music in which instruments have been replaced with isolated riffs, beats 
and other sounds (recognizable or not) taken from preexisting works88—the 
examples are countless. 
Essentially, the history of popular music, and increasingly popular art as a 
whole, is a history of artistic development irrevocably connected with the progress 
of technology and its ability to enable the creation and enrichment of new work by 
appropriating the old.89 Technology has also increased access to user-generated 
content, a new source of borrowable material, the influence of which is as easily 
observed in the visual art of proponents of the appropriation art movement such as 
Jeff Koons (further explored in Part II) as it is in the collaborative world of web-
based musicians who exchange content amongst their community in an internet 
sub-sphere. The fear, then, is that ambiguity in the regulation of appropriation could 
have an enormous chilling effect on the development of modern art, and in fact 
history has shown that new art or music forms have largely developed by 
(deliberately or not) ignoring copyright issues.90 
In fact, textual ambiguities of the relevant legislation are not the only 
challenges faced by those who seek to clear the rights of the original material for 
their derivative works. Clearing rights can also be a very challenging process as it is 
not always easy to identify rightsholders. Further, even when a rightsholder is 
identified, there remains a risk of blocking, since the rightsholder might deny 
authorization or ask too high of a price.91 This process, averse to the spontaneous 
creation process of authors, thus involves many uncertainties and high transaction 
 
87. Kyle Adams, What Did Danger Mouse Do? The Grey Album and Musical Composition in 
Configurable Culture, 37 MUSIC THEORY SPECTRUM 7 (2015); Urs Gasser & Ernst Silke, From 
Shakespeare to DJ Danger Mouse: A Quick Look at Copyright and User Creativity in the Digital  
Age (Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society, Publication No. 2006-05, 2006), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=909223 [https://perma.cc/3U6Y-GA8G]. 
88. Gervais, supra note 80. 
89. Id. (positing that the trend towards pastiche can be connected to the development of 
technology, the rise of DJ culture, nostalgia for the past, the proliferation of sound and an increased 
open mindedness about new forms of culture). 
90. In fact, as rightsholders, they are not obliged to give their consent for the use of their work 
in derivative works. They may decide to deny their authorization in cases where either the price is not 
what they would wish or the use is not aligned with their vision for their work, or if they wish to 
exclusively license the use of their work to another entity or even wish to potentially produce a similar 
genre of derivative work themselves in the future and want to retain monopoly rights. 
91. BARBARA STRATTON, SEEKING NEW LANDSCAPES: A RIGHTS CLEARANCE STUDY IN 
THE CONTEXT OF MASS DIGITISATION OF 140 BOOKS PUBLISHED BETWEEN 1870 AND 2010, at 10 
(2011); DENISE TROLL COVEY, ACQUIRING COPYRIGHT PERMISSION TO DIGITIZE AND PROVIDE 
OPEN ACCESS TO BOOKS (2005); ANNA VUOPALA, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ASSESSMENT OF THE 
ORPHAN WORKS ISSUE AND COST FOR RIGHTS CLEARANCE 10 (2010); David Fagundes, Efficient 
Copyright Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1814 (2013) (“[E]ven where owners are readily 
identifiable, the costs of negotiation and bargaining may be prohibitive . . . .”); Stef van Gompel &  
P. Bernt Hugenholtz, The Orphan Works Problem: The Copyright Conundrum of Digitizing Large-Scale 
Audiovisual Archives, and How to Solve It, 8 POPULAR COMM. 61, 62 (2010); Stef van Gompel, 
Unlocking the Potential of Pre-Existing Content: How to Address the Issue of Orphan Works in Europe?, 
38 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 669 (2007). 
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costs.92 In this context, artists may prefer to accept being an infringer and take on a 
potential risk of litigation.93 In fact, in practice, rightsholders are likely to tolerate 
these borrowings as long as the success of the work is very limited, the use is non-
commercial, or both. Thus, this approach is mostly adopted in cases involving user-
generated content on social media. The legal problems most of the time only start 
to emerge once the works become largely exposed and exploited; in short, when the 
new work generates financial gain.94 
As a result, the requirements placed upon outside authors for the creation of 
derivative works are cumbersome. But far more problematic from a theoretical 
point of view is that submitting the artistic creation process to the approval of 
rightsholders resembles at the end a sort of private censorship, as private entities or 
individuals have the potential to decide what can be created or not and to block the 
dissemination of new works.95 This moves copyright radically away from the spirit 
from which it emerged in the eighteenth century and from its cultural and social 
function.96 Thus, it seems imperative to both explore ways to make freedom of 
artistic creativity fully compatible with copyright law and assess the different options 
available for legislators and courts to secure creative uses in the context of derivative 
works in order to develop a satisfying legal mechanism de lege ferenda. 
 
92. These costs may occur as a result of difficulties identifying the author, or the author’s heir, 
with a particular problem existing in the case of orphan works (works where the rightsholders are 
impossible to identify or find). 
93. E.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572–73 (1994) (“2 Live Crew’s 
manager informed Acuff–Rose that 2 Live Crew had written a parody of ‘Oh, Pretty Woman,’ that they 
would afford all credit for ownership and authorship of the original song to Acuff–Rose . . . and that 
they were willing to pay a fee for the use they wished to make of it. Acuff–Rose’s agent refused 
permission, stating that ‘I am aware of the success enjoyed by “The 2 Live Crews”, but I must inform 
you that we cannot permit the use of a parody of “Oh, Pretty Woman.”’ Nonetheless . . . 2 Live Crew 
released records, cassette tapes, and compact discs of ‘Pretty Woman’ . . . [identifying] its publisher as 
Acuff–Rose.”). 
94. Apart from Campbell, other examples include the making of a sequel to the work of a 
famous French classic, Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] 1e civ., Jan. 30, 
2007, Bull. Civ. I, (Fr.) (Hugo v. Plon SA); the use of passages from a play for insertion in a new play, 
German Constitutional Court, “Germania 3,” 29 June 2000, GRUR INT. 149 (Ger.); and the creation 
of a sculpture by a famous American artist on the basis of a copyright-protected photograph, Tribunal 
de Grande Instance [TGI] [Ordinary Court of Original Jurisdiction] Paris, Mar. 9, 2017, N°RG :15/
01086 (Fr.). 
95. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 378 
(1996) (“Given copyright owners’ propensity to private censorship and systematic ability to demand 
supracompetitive license fees, copyright owners’ expansive control over transformative uses unduly 
stifles the creative reformulation of existing expression . . . .”); see also Neil W. Netanel, Market 
Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1879–82 (2000); Neil 
W. Netanel, Copyright and ‘Market Power’ in the Marketplace of Ideas, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND 
COPYRIGHT 149 (François Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright 
and Democracy: A Cautionary Note, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2000). 
96. Christophe Geiger, The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or How Ethics Can 
Influence the Shape and Use of IP Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: METHODS AND 
PERSPECTIVES 153 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2013). 
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II. APPROXIMATING FREEDOM OF ARTISTIC CREATIVITY AND COPYRIGHT LAW: 
THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF LIMITATIONS 
Part II will analyze the use of copyright exceptions and limitations in 
continental Europe, the United States, and Canada in trying to balance the freedom 
of artistic creativity while giving effect to the interest of rightsholders. As it will be 
shown, results can sometimes be quite unpredictable and/or, in European 
countries, due to an often narrow drafting of the limitations, too one-sided. As a 
result, courts must sometimes look outside the copyright system to restore balance: 
this need for external intervention illuminates current copyright law’s inadequacy in 
dealing with upholding artistic creativity on its own terms. 
A. The Existing (Unsatisfying) Internal Mechanism: Current Exceptions and Limitations 
to Copyright Law 
1. Trying to Make Creative Use Fit Under Current Free Spaces of Copyright Law: 
Exceptions and Limitations in Continental Systems and in the United States 
In Continental-European copyright systems, authors who wish to use existing 
works for artistic purposes have recourse to the limitations and exceptions 
permitted by law, such as quotations, parody, and freie Benutzung (free use).97 Such 
provisions can, however, in certain respects appear insufficient as a satisfactory 
guarantee of the freedom to create. 
First, in certain countries the quotation exception still seems to be restricted 
to text; it is thus often impossible to quote an image. The French Supreme Court,98 
for instance, still regularly reiterates that the integral representation “of a work of 
whatever form or duration cannot constitute a brief quotation.”99 Moreover, 
quotation for artistic purposes frequently requires the breach of the strict limits 
imposed by the wording of the law.100 Accordingly, it is not surprising that on 
numerous occasions judges have had no choice but to apply fundamental rights 
such as the freedom of expression or the freedom of creativity in order to “push 
through” the quotation exception.101 
 
97. German Copyright Act (Urheberrechtsgesetz, UrhG), art. 24. 
98. Cour de Cassation–the highest French court in the judicial order. 
99. Cass. 1e civ., Nov. 13, 2003, Bull. Civ. 1, No. 76 (Fr.). 
100. LIONEL BOCHURBERG, LE DROIT DE CITATION 128–29 (1994). 
101. See, e.g., Cass. 1e civ., May 15, 2015, Bull. Civ. 1, No. 13-27391 (Fr.); Medienprofessor Case, 
Austrian Supreme Court 12 June 2001, [2002] GRUR INT. 341, 33 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 994; Hague Court of Appeals, Church of Scientology v. XS4ALL, 4 September 2003, 
6 AMI 222 (2003); Supreme Court of the Canton of Zurich, Sept. 9, 2004, MEDIALEX 231 (2004); 
German Constitutional Court, “Germania 3,” 29 June 2000, GRUR INT. 149 (2001); District Court of 
Paris, 3e civ., Feb. 23, 1999 184 RIDA 374 (2000). However, there have admittedly been numerous 
decisions that have refused to apply the fundamental rights, holding that the balance between copyright 
and freedom of expression had already been implemented within copyright by means of the existing 
limits. See ALAIN STROWEL & FRANÇOIS TULKENS, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET LIBERTÉ D’EXPRESSION 
(2006); Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental 
Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION 
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Parody also has limited possibilities. Indeed, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) recently decided in the Deckmyn case in 2014 on a uniform 
definition of the concept of parody.102 According to the court, “the essential 
characteristics of parody are, first, to evoke an existing work while being noticeably 
different from it, and, secondly, to constitute an expression of humour or 
mockery.”103 Therefore, in order to constitute a parody, there is a requirement to 
have a humorous or satirical aesthetic, which is seldom the case in a musical context 
such as sampling but is also not always the case in appropriation art. Moreover, what 
constitutes a parody is often understood very narrowly. Indeed, in that same case, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union specifies that article 5(3)(k) of Directive 
2001/29, outlining the exception to copyrights for parody purposes, needs to be 
interpreted “strictly.”104 Outside the humoristic exceptions, some legal systems also 
have a concept of “free use of a work.”105 This is particularly the case in Germany.106 
Indeed, German law does not have a specific exception for parodies, but parodies 
have been allowed if they are considered to be “free use.” When doing so, the 
German Federal Court of Justice considered that the German free use limitation 
must be interpreted according to EU law, and in particular to the ruling of the CJEU 
in Deckmyn.107 The free use limitation comes from Article 24 of the Copyright Act, 
which permits the author to freely exploit a work created on the basis of another 
work, provided that the personal characteristics of the first work are lost in the 
derived work.108 However, here too, this possibility has been traditionally 
interpreted strictly by the literature as well as by the judicial practice, and is rarely 
upheld in the context of creative reuses of copyrighted material.109 
 
L. 371 (2006); P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe, in EXPANDING 
THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE 
SOCIETY 343 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). For an overview, drawing on the case law of the 
ECtHR and the CJEU, of the influence of the right to freedom of expression and information on 
European copyright law in the digital context, see Elena Izyumenko, The Freedom of Expression Contours 
of Copyright in the Digital Era: A European Perspective, 19 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 115 (2016). 
102. Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014 E.C.R. XX. 
103. Id. § 20. For comment, see Geiger et al., supra note 20; Sabine Jacques, Are National Courts 
Required to Have an (Exceptional) European Sense of Humour?, 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 134 (2015). 
104. Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014 E.C.R. 22–23. 
105. German Copyright Act, Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL I at 1273, § 24, last amended by the Act, Dec. 
20, 2016, BGBL I at 3037, art. 1 (Ger.). 
106. Analogously, see § 5(2) of the Austrian Copyright Act. 
107. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], decision of 28 July 2016. For a 
comment, see Henrike Maier, German Federal Court of Justice Rules on Parody and Free Use, 12  
J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 16, 17 (2017). 
108. Detailed in Article 24 of the German Copyright Act. See Duhanic, supra note 12, at 1010-
11. 
109. See ADOLF DIETZ, CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, PETER WAND & SARAH MERZBACH, 
COPYRIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (2008). However, a recent decision of the German 
Constitutional Court of 31 May 2016, Metall auf Metall (1 BvR 1585/13) might lead to a change, 
allowing a sample of a song of the German band Kraftwerk by a hip hop artist on the basis of freedom 
of artistic creativity protected by the German Constitution (art. 5 (3)). It is thus not unlikely that the 
provision will in the future be interpreted in a more liberal way by courts in the light of the freedom of 
creativity protected by the German constitution. On this decision, see infra. 
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Unlike the systems of Continental Europe, which are based on strictly 
enumerated exempted uses, certain common law countries frame copyright 
limitations as open-ended provisions, which allows reacting to new situations in a 
more flexible way. U.S. fair use constitutes perhaps the most prominent example. 
Indeed, “fair use” is a doctrine that allows the use of copyrighted material without 
asking for permission from the original author of the work in a limited set of 
circumstances specified in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act.110 This limitation 
to copyright is considered “open-ended” since there are—beyond the fair uses 
enumerated in the provision such as news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or 
research—no limited situations in which the use would be considered “fair” or not. 
In general, the copying needs to be done for a limited and “transformative” purpose, 
meaning that the derivative work uses the original work in a new and different way 
in order to be considered a “fair use.”111 
The U.S. Supreme Court holding in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,112 which 
definitively adopted the “transformative use” paradigm over other paradigms,113 
constitutes a good illustration of permissible creative reuse, as the Court ruled in 
favor of 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” despite the 
commercial character of the derivative work.114 The appellate court had decided that 
the commercial nature of the parody made the work “presumptively unfair.”115 
However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the commercial nature of a 
parody was only one of the factors to take into consideration in evaluating the 
purpose and character of the work, and therefore could not constitute an evidentiary 
presumption.116 
In a Second Circuit case, Blanch v. Koons, the court had to evaluate whether the 
adaptation and use of an existing image in a commissioned collage painting by Jeff 
Koons was an infringement of the original photographer’s copyright.117 The court 
 
110. The U.S. Copyright Act provides that uses are fair and non-infringing depending on four 
factors: the purpose and character of the use; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount 
appropriated from the copyrighted work; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
111. Rich Stim, Measuring Fair Use: The Four Factors, STAN. COPYRIGHT & FAIR  
USE CTR. (Apr. 10, 2017), http://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/four-factors/ 
[https://perma.cc/WG2T-WBX8]. 
112. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
113. Netanel, supra note 8. The Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose even calls the 
transformative inquiry the “heart of the fair use” doctrine. The Court built on previous analysis of Judge 
Leval, considering in his famous article on fair use in the Harvard Law Review that the transformative 
test lies “at the heart of fair use.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use 
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)). 
114. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569. 
115. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1436 (1992). 
116. As the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, “[T]he more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that 
may weigh against a finding of fair use.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
117. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain 
Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (where Mattel brought an unsuccessful copyright infringement 
action against Tom Forsythe for his photographs depicting a doll in sexually compromising positions); 
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explored each factor of the fair use analysis, weighed them together in light of the 
general purpose of copyright law, and came to the conclusion that copyright’s goal 
of “promoting the progress of science and useful arts” would be better served by 
allowing creative reuse of the copyrighted image in a collage painting.118 The 
copyrighted work was use of a “raw material,” but the fact that the use was 
transformative allowed the court to consider that it was fair.119 In Cariou v. Prince,120 
a case regarding the defendant’s reuse of the plaintiff’s photographs in a series of 
paintings and a collage, the Second Circuit found that the appropriation of the 
copyrighted photographs was also a fair use,121 although cases involving 
appropriation might not always turn out this way.122 Indeed, the general 
understanding is that “there must be at least some kind of commentary at work for 
a fair use claim to have a chance,”123 but there have been some inconsistencies, in 
particular Blanch v. Koons, where commentary was not at work. It is therefore true 
that the results of the application of the open-ended fair use provision can be hard 
to predict in the case of creative re-appropriations.124 
The Cariou v. Prince decision expanded the application of transformative use, 
which has since become the most dominant of the fair use factors and, as an 
 
Mattel v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (a lawsuit between Mattel and MCA Records that 
resulted from the 1997 Aqua song, “Barbie Girl,” which was ultimately dismissed). However, in an 
earlier case, the Second Circuit refused to allow the fair use defense for Koon’s creative reuse of the 
image of puppies on a greeting card in his famous sculpture “String of puppies.” See Roger v. Koons, 
960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and 
Post-Modernism, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 23–33 (1992) (criticizing the Rogers v. Koons decision 
as failing to recognize the nature of post-modern appropriation art); Peter Jaszi, Is There Such a Thing 
as Postmodern Copyright?, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 105 (2009) (discussing evolution of 
standards in appropriation art in U.S. case law from Rogers v. Koons to Blanch v. Koons). 
118. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 244. 
119. Id. at 253. 
120. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
121. However, at the trial court level, the uses were found infringing and fair use was  
denied. The judge considered the “transformative content of Prince’s painting minimal at best,” even 
allowing Cariou to destroy the paintings. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 348 (S.D.N.Y 2011). 
122. Appropriation art is regularly the subject of litigation, which is the source of major 
uncertainties for artists and producers involved in these art forms. For a critique on the uncertainty left 
by the fair use doctrine in the case of new art forms, see Adler, supra note 7, at 566, (underlining that 
“the disparate results in these cases, not to mention the high costs of litigating against a backdrop of 
uncertainty, help explain why a climate of ‘self-censorship’ has taken hold in the art world”); see also 
Graham v. Prince, 265 F. Supp. 3d 366, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (another important case involving 
appropriation art, which was recently decided before the Southern District of New York). 
123. Allan Behr, Appropriation of Photos: Where to Draw the Line — Part 2, LAW360 (May 4, 
2012, 1:31 PM), https://www.law360.com/media/articles/331472/appropriation-of-photos-where-
to-draw-the-line-part-2 [https://perma.cc/LY4E-9TAW]. 
124. This is the reason why in the context of appropriation art, the transformative test has been 
heavily criticized as an “obstacle to creativity.” As one scholar has emphasized: 
Artistic expression has emerged as a central fair use battleground in courts. At the same time 
that art depends on copying, the transformative test has made the legality of copying in art 
more uncertain, leaving artists vulnerable to lawsuits under a doctrine that is incoherent and 
that fundamentally misunderstands the very creative work it governs. 
Adler, supra note 7, at 559. 
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empirical matter, tends to be determinant in creative use situations.125 For example, 
in the case Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., the court ruled in favor of the rock band Green 
Day when it used an artist’s illustration in a video displayed during several of its 
concerts without the artist’s authorization.126 The court considered the use 
transformative and not a mere quotation, because the illustration was used as a “raw 
material” and the aesthetic modifications made by the rock band to the original 
illustration conveyed a new message and was distinct from the original work.127 
As we have seen, a key inquiry into whether non-parodic appropriation art is 
fair use is whether the use is considered transformative. The concern here is a lack 
of guidance about how much observable difference is required for a finding  
of transformative usage.128 Daniel Gervais, for example, argues that 
“transformativeness” is a feature of fair use in order to create a new work rather 
than a direct reuse; the key inquiry would involve “an equation that reflects the 
amount of originality of the primary work, the quality and quantity of the originality 
transferred from the primary work to the derivative work, and the amount of 
originality and purpose added by the author of the derivative work.”129 Others, such 
as Darren Hudson Hick, go further to suggest that “to whatever degree the new 
work appropriates from the preexisting work, where the new work is used to express 
some distinct idea, . . . such a use [should] be recognized as transformative and so 
presumptively fair.”130 In any case, it will largely depend on the facts of the case as 
the addition might be minor but still convey a different and strong artistic 
message.131 In some situations, there might not be any addition at all, as it will be 
the context in which the original artwork is shown that will be the vehicle of the 
artistic message. This is of course the case in the context of “ready-mades” where 
 
125. This far-reaching development to create free spaces for appropriation art has not been 
unanimously approved though. For a critical comment, see, for example, Jacqueline Morley, The 
Unfettered Expansion of Appropriation Art Protection by the Fair Use Doctrine: Searching for 
Transformativeness in Cariou v. Prince and Beyond, 55 IDEA — INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 385, 398–408 
(2015). The author states that “the Second Circuit’s decision blurred the already unclear meaning of 
transformativeness within the Fair Use Doctrine,” id. at 398, and that “the [w]orks that the Second 
Circuit [r]emanded [s]hould [h]ave [b]een [c]ondemned as [n]ot [t]ransformative in [o]rder to [c]reate a 
[c]lear [s]tandard,” id. at 408. 
126. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
127. Id.; see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (to be transformative, 
the Supreme Court in Campbell considered that the secondary work needs to modify the first with a 
“new meaning or message”); Adler, supra note 7, at 563 (underlining, in order to determine “meaning” 
in fair use case, the courts take different approaches, where “some depend on the artist’s statement of 
intent, some depend on aesthetics or formal comparison, and some depend on the viewpoint of the 
‘reasonable observer’”); Morley, supra note 125, at 410 (l inking this decision with past appropriation art 
cases). 
128. Adler, supra note 7; Liz Brown, Remixing Transformative Use: A Three-Part Proposal for 
Reform 4 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 139 (2014); Morley, supra note 125, at 398. 
129. Daniel Gervais, The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects Foxes Better Than 
Hedgehogs, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 785 (2013). 
130. Darren Hudson Hick, Appropriation and Transformation, 23 FORDHAM  
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1155 (2013). 
131. A good example is the moustache added by Marcel Duchamp in 1919 on a photograph of 
the famous Mona Lisa of Leonardo da Vinci on a postcard, with the humorous title “L.H.O.O.Q.” 
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the original work is placed in a different artistic context.132 This is why some scholars 
in the United States have advocated that the degree of transformation test should 
be abandoned “as it has failed art,” made the legality of copying in art more 
uncertain, and thus has created a detrimentally chilling effect on contemporary art 
movements where appropriation has started to play a central role.133 
2. The Introduction of a Specific Exception for Creative Reuses: The Canadian Example 
A solution to the problems of both enumerated exceptions and open-ended 
provisions can perhaps be found in an alternative mechanism: the introduction of a 
specific limitation for creative reuses. Such a limitation is currently widely discussed 
in the context of non-commercial practices by internet users in order to address 
many creative uses, particularly by those on social media, a practice often called 
creating “user-generated content.”134 Interestingly, the possibility of a copyright 
limitation for “user-generated content” was examined back in 2008 by the European 
Commission in its Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy.135 In 
the public consultation launched in late 2013 on the review of EU copyright rules, 
the Commission once again considered introducing an exception for transformative 
uses into the European copyright framework.136 More recently, in its non-legislative 
resolution of July 9, 2015, the European Parliament also addressed the issue and 
 
132. A “ready-made” is an everyday object selected and designated as art; the art form is 
attributed to French artist Marcel Duchamp. See FRANCIS M. NAUMANN, MARCEL DUCHAMP: THE 
ART OF MAKING ART IN THE AGE OF MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION (H.N. Abrams ed., 1999). 
133. Adler, supra note 7, at 562–63 (“There is a deeper problem with fair use that courts and 
scholars have overlooked. The transformative test poses a fundamental threat to art because the test 
evaluates art by the very criteria that contemporary art rejects.”). 
134. See, on this issue and its copyright implications, CHRISTIAN A. BAUER,  
USER GENERATED CONTENT URHEBERRECHTLICHE ZULÄSSIGKEIT NUTZERGENERIERTER 
MEDIENINHALTE (2011); Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-
Generated Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841 (2009); Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the 
Culture of the Masses: A Manifesto for User-Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921 (2009); 
Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part One - Investiture of Ownership, 
10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863 (2008); Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: Transformation 
in Practice, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497 (2008); Mary W.S. Wong, “Transformative” User-Generated 
Content in Copyright Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1075 
(2009). 
135. Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, supra note 21. For a comment on this document, see 
Christophe Geiger et al., What Limitations to Copyright in the Information Society? A Comment on the 
European Commission’s Green Paper “Copyright in the Knowledge Economy,” 40 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMP. L. 412 (2009); see also Euan Lawson, Orphan Works and Transformative Works in the Knowledge 
Economy, 20 ENT. L. REV. 61, 61 (2009) (examining “whether a copyright exception should be created 
for user-generated content on the basis that it is ‘transformative’”). 
136. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE REVIEW OF THE  
EU COPYRIGHT RULES 28–30 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/ 
2013/copyright-rules/docs/consultation-document_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL69-LBY2]. For an 
overview of responses to this consultation, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE RESPONSES 
TO THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE REVIEW OF THE EU COPYRIGHT RULES  
67–71 (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/docs/
contributions/consultation-report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8XB-284C] (covering the questions 
related to the user-generated content). 
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called for a balanced solution in the case of transformative uses.137 However, those 
envisaged proposals in Europe were not adopted into law and remain a heavily 
debated topic.138 
Nevertheless, one formulation of this solution has recently been implemented 
in Canada. Section 29.21 (Non-commercial User-generated Content) of the 
Canadian Copyright Modernization Act specifies a list of cumulative conditions 
where: 
it is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to use an existing 
work or other subject-matter or copy of one, which has been published or 
otherwise made available to the public, in the creation of a new work or 
other subject-matter in which copyright subsists and for the individual – 
or, with the individual’s authorization, a member of their household – to 
use the new work or other subject-matter or to authorize an intermediary 
to disseminate it.139 
 
137. European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the Implementation of Directive 2001/
29/EC on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society, P8_TA-PROV (2015) 0273, § 42 (“The European Parliament . . . , notes with interest the 
development of new forms of use of works on digital networks, in particular transformative uses, and 
stresses the need to examine solutions reconciling efficient protection that provides for proper 
remuneration and fair compensation for creators with the public interest for access to cultural goods 
and knowledge.”) (emphasis added); see also Christophe Geiger, Oleksandr Bulayenko, Théo  
Hassler, Elena Izyumenko, Franciska Schönherr & Xavier Seuba, The Resolution of the European 
Parliament of 9 July 2015: Paving the Way (Finally) for a Copyright Reform in the European Union?, 37  
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 683 (2015). 
138. On this issue, see Bernd Justin Jütte, The EU’s Trouble with Mashups: From Disabling to 
Enabling a Digital Art Form, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. E-COM. L. 172 (2014) (analyzing the 
current European legal framework with regard to user generated content and identifying its 
insufficiencies, in particular with regard to enabling a legal mashup culture). 
139. Section 29.21 (Non-commercial User-generated Content) of the Canadian Copyright 
Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c 20 (Can.), reads as follows: 
(1) It is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to use an existing work or other 
subject-matter or copy of one, which has been published or otherwise made available to the 
public, in the creation of a new work or other subject-matter in which copyright subsists and 
for the individual – or, with the individual’s authorization, a member of their household – 
to use the new work or other subject-matter or to authorize an intermediary to disseminate 
it, if (a) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or other subject-matter 
is done solely for non-commercial purposes; (b) the source – and, if given in the source, the 
name of the author, performer, maker or broadcaster – of the existing work or other subject-
matter or copy of it are mentioned, if it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so; (c) the 
individual had reasonable grounds to believe that the existing work or other subject-matter 
or copy of it, as the case may be, was not infringing copyright; and (d) the use of, or the 
authorization to disseminate, the new work or other subject-matter does not have a 
substantial adverse effect, financial or otherwise, on the exploitation or potential 
exploitation of the existing work or other subject-matter – or copy of it – or on an existing 
or potential market for it, including that the new work or other subject-matter is not a 
substitute for the existing one. (2) The following definitions apply in subsection (1): 
‘intermediary’ means a person or entity who regularly provides space or means for works or 
other subject-matter to be enjoyed by the public. ‘Use’ means to do anything that by this Act 
the owner of the copyright has the sole right to do, other than the right to authorize anything. 
Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c 20, § 29.21 (Can.). 
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The main criteria in order to fit within this definition, according to section 
29.21, are (1) the non-commercial purpose of the intended use and (2) the absence 
of negative adverse effect, financial or otherwise, on the existing work.140 It is 
however worth noting that the Canadian model is limited to non-commercial uses, 
which is not always easy to distinguish from commercial use.141 In addition, the 
wording of the provision is rather complex, therefore limiting its accessibility and 
comprehensibility to the common public and/or creators, while creating difficulties 
in implementation for courts.142 
The main problem with the current solutions described above, allowing 
creative reuses of protected works based on open-ended, enumerated, and user-
generated content exceptions, is that they are all free of charge.143 Thus, when they 
do not otherwise result in adverse effects, they might be suitable in the context of 
non-commercial uses but might be considered unfair in a commercial context, e.g., 
when a famous book is made into a movie. In addition, it is often difficult to draw 
the line between a commercial or non-commercial use, which makes things even 
more complicated. Consequently, courts will likely interpret the limitation narrowly, 
leaving many situations of creative reuses without an appropriate answer. 
B. The Consequence: The Increasing Use of External Mechanisms such as Human Rights 
to Solve the Conflict 
Existing internal mechanisms do not always provide appropriate answers for 
the creative reuse of work. Therefore, an obstacle to creativity still exists if an author 
intends to create a new work based on a former one and the original author refuses 
to give authorization or asks for too high a price. For that reason, courts came up 
with some ad hoc solutions when faced with copyright claims in the context of 
derivative works. In particular, courts have often relied on external mechanisms, 
such as fundamental rights-based reasoning, in order to overcome the hurdle of 
exclusivity. 
 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. On the pros and cons of importing the Canadian user-generated content exception to  
other legal systems, see P.K. Yu, Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be Transplanted Abroad?, 26  
INTELL. PROP. J. 177 (2014). For comments on Section 29.21 of the Canadian Copyright Modernization 
Act, see Joost Blom, Private International Law Aspects of User-Generated Content, 26 INTELL. PROP. J. 205 
(2014); Christophe Geiger, Canada - Contenu Non Commercial Généré par l’Utilisateur/Non-Commercial 
User-Generated Content, PROPRIÉTÉS INTELLECTUELLES 91, 92 (2016); Theresa Scassa, Acknowledging 
Copyright’s Illegitimate Offspring: User-Generated Content and Canadian Copyright Law, in THE 
COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 431 (M. Geist ed., 2013). More generally on the various forms of 
appropriation and the way they are addressed in Canadian copyright law, see DYNAMIC FAIR DEALING: 
CREATING CANADIAN CULTURE ONLINE (R. Coombe, D. Wershler & M. Zeilinger eds., 2014); 
Warren B. Chik, Paying It Forward: The Case for a Specific Statutory Limitation on Exclusive Rights for 
User-Generated Content Under Copyright Law, 11 JOHN MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 240 (2011). 
143. Section 29.21 covers non-commercial user-generated content. 
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1. The Human Right to Free Artistic Creation as an Internal and External Limit to 
Copyright Law: The Decisions of the German Constitutional Court 
The German Constitutional Court has recognized the admissibility of 
numerous restrictions of the exclusive right of authors or their derivative 
rightsholders in the past when the creative interests of secondary authors were 
concerned.144 In “Germania 3,” which concerned the refusal of the heirs of Bertolt 
Brecht to allow the use of passages from a play by their ancestor for insertion in a 
new play in order to permit a critical analysis in artistic form, the court gave 
precedence to the secondary author’s freedom to create laid out in Article 5(3) 
(artistic freedom) of the German Basic Law over “a minor infringement of 
copyright that only involved a minimal financial loss for the right holders.”145 The 
German court thus provided an expansive interpretation of the quotation exception 
on the basis of artistic freedom from Article 5(3) of the German Basic Law and used 
human rights as a tool to broaden existing limitations in the copyright system. 
In 2016, the German constitutional court allowed freedom of artistic 
expression to once again prevail over the exploitation interests of the original author 
in Metall auf Metall.146 In this case, a hip hop artist created a song using a sample 
from an existing song by the German music band Kraftwerk.147 The right of the hip 
hop artist to freedom of creative expression was balanced against the exploitation 
interests of the phonogram’s producers; the importance of artistic dialogue 
prevailed, justifying an interference with copyright and related rights.148 According 
to the German constitutional court, “if the creative development of an artist is 
measured against an interference with copyrights that only slightly limits the 
possibilities of exploitation, the exploitation interests of the copyright holders may have to 
cede in favour of the freedom to enter into an artistic dialogue.”149 With this ruling, the 
court recognized that sampling is protected by artistic freedom of expression. Of 
course, not all appropriation situations are covered, and sampling can still constitute 
 
144. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], June 29, 2000, 3 
GRUR INT. 149, § 22 (2001) (Ger.); Federal Constitutional Court, First Senate, Metall auf Metall, 31 
May 2016, 1 BvR 1585/13 (Ger.). 
145. 3 GRUR INT. 149 (§ 22) (Ger.). For a comment, see Elizabeth Adeney & Christoph 
Antons, The Germania 3 Decision Translated: The Quotation Exception Before the German Constitutional 
Court, 35 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 646 (2013). 
146. 1 BvR 1585/13 (Ger.). For comments, see Duhanic, supra note 12; Mathias Leistner, Die 
“Metall auf Metall”-Entscheidung des BVerfG - Oder: Warum das Urheberrecht in Karlsruhe in Guten 
Händen ist, 8 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 772 (2016); Marc  
D. Mimler, “Metall auf Metall” – The German Federal Constitutional Court Discusses the Permissibility 
of Sampling Music Tracks, 7 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 119 (2017). 
147. 1 BvR 1585/13 (Ger.). 
148. Press Release, Bundesverfassungsgericht, The Use of Samples for Artistic  
Purposes May Justify an Interference with Copyrights and Related Rights (May 31,  
2016), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2016/
bvg16-029.html [https://perma.cc/67VX-GAML]. 
149. Art. 5 (artistic freedom) of the GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] (emphasis added), 
translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
86GC-6LNJ]. 
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an infringement to copyrights, but only if the exploitation rights of the phonograms 
are severely impaired. In addition, the two songs were not in competition and were 
easy to distinguish from one another, which were also important determining 
factors in the reasoning of the court.150 
2. The Use of Article 10 European Convention of Human Rights by Domestic Civil 
Courts to Legitimate Creative Reuses 
The French courts have also used human rights as an external limit to 
copyright. In a highly publicized case in which Victor Hugo’s heirs tried to invoke 
the famous author’s moral rights to prevent a sequel to Les Misérables, the French 
Supreme Court prioritized the freedom of artistic creation.151 Citing Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the court held that, subject 
to the rights to paternity and integrity of the adapted work, freedom of creativity 
prevented the original author of the work or his heirs from hindering the production 
of a sequel after the exploitation monopoly expired.152 More recently, in an 
important 2015 decision that concerned the creative reuse of three copyright-
protected photographs in a painting, the French Supreme Court, once again 
referring to Article 10 of the ECHR, reversed the lower court’s finding of 
infringement.153 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision was based on the ground 
that the appeal court neither showed how exactly the fair balance between the 
freedom of artistic expression and the copyright-holder’s interests had been 
achieved, nor had sufficiently justified its decision in light of the freedom of 
creativity protected by the ECHR.154 The three photographs had been integrated 
 
150. See Mimler, supra note 146. 
151. Cass., 1e civ., Jan. 30 2007, Hugo v. Plon SA (Fr.), 38 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & 
COMP. L. 736, 738 (2007). For a comment, see Christophe Geiger, Copyright and the Freedom to Create 
– A Fragile Balance, 38 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 707 (2007). 
152. Cass., 1e civ., Jan. 30 2007, Hugo v. Plon SA (Fr.), 38 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. AND 
COMP. L. 736, 738 (2007). 
153. Cass., Bull. 1e civ., May 15, 2015, Bull. civ. I, No. 13-27391 (Fr.). For a comment, see 
Christophe Geiger, Droit d’Auteur et Liberté d’Expression Artistique: Art ‘Autorisé’ et Libre Création 
Ne Font Pas Bon Ménage, 38 LA SEMAIFNE JURIDIQUE 1620 (2015); see also, with the same reasoning, 
the decision of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, HR 3 April 2015, m.nt. EE (GS Media 
BV/Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and Others) (Neth.). Many other examples could be given also in 
other fields of IP, where courts have justified the creative use of a trademark or of a protected design 
with the right to freedom of expression protected by Article 10 ECHR. For trademark, see the 
numerous cases quoted in Christophe Geiger, Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression – The 
Proportionality of Criticism, 38 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 317 (2007); for designs, see, for 
example, the Court of Appeal of the Hague, 4 May 2011, 389526/ KG ZA 11-294; Jani McCutcheon, 
Designs, Parody and Artistic Expression- A Comparative Perspective of Plesner v. Louis Vuitton, 41 
MONASH U. L. REV. 192 (2015). Cf. BGH, Apr. 2, 2015, Leaping Poodle, I ZR 59/13, unreported, 
translation from German in 47 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 358 (2016) (ruling that the artistic 
freedom did not justify the taking advantage of the repute and distinctiveness of the well-known 
trademark). 
154. Cass., Bull. 1e civ., May 15, 2015, Bull. civ. I, No. 13-27391 (Fr.). Unfortunately, since then 
the Versailles Court of Appeal in its judgement of remittal of March 16, 2018, No. 15/06029 (Fr.), in 
the same case took a more restrictive approach and decided that the appropriation of the photograph 
was infringing the copyright of the photographer. For further English information about the case, see 
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into the painter’s work after being colored.155 In this case, the defendant explained 
that his artistic approach was to “use advertising images by modifying them in order 
to provoke thinking, a contrast leading to divert the original theme and topic and 
expressing something totally different.”156 In finding in favor of the defendant, the 
French Supreme Court put an end to an ongoing debate that had lasted over fifteen 
years regarding the use of fundamental rights in intellectual property litigation, and 
established the need to determine a fair balance between copyright and the freedom 
of expression on a case-by-case manner. The District Court of The Hague held a 
similar line of reasoning in the 2011 “Dafurnica” case.157 The case was about an art 
series depicting a Louis Vuitton bag in the hands of an African child holding a 
Chihuahua.158 The art series was called “Simple Living,” pointing out a paradox 
between the luxury product from Louis Vuitton and famine striking in Africa.159 
Overruling the judgment rendered in preliminary proceedings,160 the district court 
allowed the parodist’s freedom of expression to prevail.161 
Yet freedom of artistic creativity does not always prevail in courts and the 
outcome is by no means certain. For example, the Paris court of first instance 
decided on March 9, 2017,162 that a Jeff Koons statue inspired by a French 
photograph infringed on the original author’s copyright.163 The court mainly based 
its decision on the fact that the original photograph was not very well known to the 
public and there was no clear reference made to the original work.164 Ultimately, 
 
Eleonora Rosati, Not Sufficiently ‘Transformative’ Appropriation of a Photograph Held Infringing by French 
Court, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 525 (2018). 
155. Cass., Bull. 1e civ., May 15, 2015, Bull. civ. I, No. 13-27391 (Fr.). 
156. Id. 
157. District Court of The Hague, 4 May 2011, IER 2011/39 m.nt WS (Nadia Plesner Joensen/
Louis Vuitton Malletier SA) (Neth.). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. District Court of The Hague, 27 January 2011, LJN: BP9616 KG RK 10-214 m.nt (Louis 
Vuitton Malletier SA/Nadia Plesner Joensen) (Neth.). 
161. Lucie Guibault, The Netherlands: Dafurnica, Miffy and the Right to Parody!, 2  
J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 236, 237 (2011). See also Laugh It Off Promotions CC 
v. S. Afr. Breweries Int’l (Fin.) B.V. 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) (S. Afr.), for a ruling that a commercial 
parody on a T-shirt had to prevail over the property interests of trademark holders. 
162. TGI Paris, Mar. 9, 2017, No. 15/01086 (Fr.). See also in the same sense the March 16, 
2018, decision of the Versailles Court of Appeal in the Klasen case discussed supra note 154. This shows 
the legal uncertainty still surrounding appropriation art and calls for a statutory solution to address the 
issue of creative reuses. See also infra Part III for more on this. 
163. TGI Paris, Mar. 9, 2017, No. 15/01086 (Fr.). 
164. The court indeed points out that the knowledge by the public of the appropriated work is 
decisive for the produced effect on the spectators and necessary to the perception of the artist’s message 
to provoke the spectator’s reflection. In this case, the artists chose to take back in whole the children 
from the photography without explicitly referring to the portrait, which was not well known by the 
public, to incarnate a new Adam and Eve, without explaining why he could not do otherwise. Thus, 
according to the court: 
[T]he copy was not dictated by considerations of general interest but personal, allowing the 
artist to use the models from the photography and by doing so, avoiding the creative work,  
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because Koons failed “to justify the necessity of using this representation of this 
couple of children in his artistic speech without the authorization of the author, the 
implementation of the plaintiff’s copyright [did] not constitute a disproportionate 
infringement to the freedom of expression.”165 Here, too, the court makes a clear 
reference to human rights balancing mechanisms,166 but does not allow the creative 
use in the end. 
As we have seen, in the absence of appropriate copyright provisions 
addressing issues of creative appropriation, courts have found solutions using 
external mechanisms such as fundamental rights to secure the creative reuse of 
copyrighted works. However, reliance on rules from outside the intellectual 
property system might not be ideal, and in fact, it might not bode well for the current 
system if a balance has to be found using correctives from outside intellectual 
property law. Therefore, a solution needs to be found facilitating the resolution of 
these unique situations using mechanisms within the copyright framework itself, 
thus making copyright law fully compatible with freedom of artistic creativity.167 
III. MAKING FREEDOM OF ARTISTIC CREATIVITY COMPATIBLE WITH 
COPYRIGHT LAW: DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING A LIMITATION FOR 
CREATIVE USE 
Given that one of the essential goals of copyright law is to promote creativity, 
it seems perfectly legitimate that the copyright system should itself sustain and 
encourage freedom of artistic creativity. Part III will explore possible approaches 
within the copyright framework to ensure that the freedom of artistic expression is 
sufficiently upheld. This exploration will culminate in the hypothesis that a 
limitation-based remuneration scheme in the form of a statutory license will be a 
practical solution to ensure that artistic freedom is protected, while simultaneously 
ensuring the protection of the creator’s interests. It will be shown that a “limitation-
based remuneration” is both workable and compliant with international copyright 
 
which could not have been made without the authorization of the author whose name and  
copyright were on the post card.  
See id. 
165. Id. (translation from French by the author). 
166. The Paris court acknowledges that freedom of expression is a fundamental right but not 
without any limitations and also makes a reference to the European Court of Human Rights 
interpretation, which places in balance freedom of expression with intellectual property rights as two 
fundamental rights on an equal stand. See id. 
167. In this sense, see Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights), 
Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights: Copyright Policy and the Right to  
Science and Culture, §§ 45–48, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/57 (Dec. 24, 2014), http://undocs.org/ 
A/HRC/28/57 (looking into statutory licenses as one of the possible mechanisms to remunerate the 
creators). Cf. Reto M. Hilty, Legal Remedies Against Abuse, Misuse, and Other Forms of Inappropriate 
Conduct of IP Right Holders, in COMPULSORY LICENSING: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND WAYS 
FORWARD 377–78 (R.M. Hilty & Kung-Chung Liu eds., 2015) (arguing that “[i]n case enforcement of 
an IP right proves to be abusive, this right should . . . [be] downgrade[d] . . . [to a] ‘liability regime[,]’” 
which would allow for “more balance . . . through monetary compensation to the right holder”). 
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obligations and constitutional requirements.168 Finally, Part III will discuss how 
such a limitation-based remuneration system for creative uses can be implemented, 
including how such a scheme would function and how remuneration should be 
determined. 
A. The Benefits of a “Limitation-Based Remuneration Right”/ Statutory License 
As established in Part II, the current copyright system does contain certain 
legal mechanisms to address the challenges of derivative works.169 But as 
demonstrated, the problem remains that any such use is “free of charge,” meaning 
that no remuneration is paid to the creator of the original work.170 The absence of 
remuneration leads to a tendency of legislators and courts to define limitations 
narrowly and exclude some important creative uses, generating additional 
uncertainties in the process. As a consequence, creators often refrain from using 
existing work, which in turn inhibits the creative process. Moreover, some uses 
made initially for non-commercial purposes can become commercially relevant 
afterwards because of their success. In this case, the initial creator should not have 
the possibility to block the exploitation of the new work, but in certain situations it 
might be fair that he is entitled to participate in the fruits generated by the derivative 
creation. Thus, for this situation, a better solution would be to create a specific 
limitation implemented in the form of a statutory license171 for derivative works 
with a clear, yet not severely limiting, scope in order to facilitate creative uses. 
1. Current Existing Non-Exclusive Solutions Inside and Outside IP Law 
The spirit of limiting exclusive rights for creative purposes can be found in the 
practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union, particularly in its famous 
Magill decision of 1995.172 In that case, the court held that refusing to grant a license 
 
168. This part of the Article draws on Christophe Geiger, Statutory Licenses as Enabler of 
Creative Uses, in REMUNERATION OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS: REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF NEW 
BUSINESS MODELS 305 (Kung-Chung Liu & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2017). 
169. See supra Part II.A.1. 
170. Particularly on the issue regarding U.S. Fair Use, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or 
Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383, 1385 (2014), where the author states: 
Fair use is an on/off switch: either the challenged use is an infringement of copyright or it 
is a fair use, which section 107 declares “is not an infringement of copyright.” As a result, 
either the copyright owner can stop the use or the user not only is dispensed from obtaining 
permission, but also owes no compensation for the use. 
Thus, some U.S. scholars have argued in favor of compulsory licensing to be applied to derivative 
works. Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use? The 1999 Donald  
C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 513, 520 (1999); cf. DAVID L. LANGE &  
H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 179, 384 n.37 (2009); Frosio, supra note 61, at 390–93; Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 1. 
171. It is acknowledged that the terms “statutory license” and “compulsory license” are 
sometimes used interchangeably. For the purpose of this piece, the “compulsory licenses” mentioned 
refer to those that require a court order. 
172. Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Comm’n, 1995 
E.C.R. I-808, §§ 49–51. 
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merely to block someone from commercializing a new product on the market was 
an abuse of the copyright owner’s dominant position.173 The use was thus allowed 
based on rules outside IP, namely competition law. In this sense a “competition 
exception” was also proposed in the context of a European Copyright Code, drawn 
up by a group of academics (the “Wittem Group”), and could serve as inspiration.174 
In the same spirit, patent law provides a mechanism for creative reuse of protected 
inventions: to prevent the holder of a patent (who is in a dominant position in view 
of a patent of improvement) from using their right to impede the exploitation of 
this improvement, the creator can sue for the issue of a compulsory license based 
on reasons of dependency. Such compulsory licenses are for example foreseen in 
Sec. 24(2) of the German Patent Act,175 Art. L. 613-15 of the French Intellectual 
Property Code,176 and Article 12 of the EU Directive on the legal protection of 
biotech inventions of 1998.177 Such compulsory licenses are also foreseen in the 
TRIPs Agreement (Article 31), and the members of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) have maintained wide discretion regarding reasons that may give rise to the 
grant of such a license.178 
The main disadvantage in all these cases is the fact that the license has to be 
ordered by a judge, a fact that favors those economic actors who have the resources 
to afford the associated high legal costs of sometimes long proceedings. While cases 
are pending, creativity is hampered. Therefore, it seems that legal regulations 
through the mechanisms of a statutory license based on a right to remuneration 
should be preferable,179 which would be due at least in the case of a commercial use 
of the derivative work. 
 
173. Id. The finding, however, took years of litigation, which demonstrates the need for internal 
mechanisms inside copyright to avoid these kinds of situations from the start. 
174. The Wittem Grp., European Copyright Code, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. &  
ELEC. COM. L. 123 (2010). Article 5.4 (Uses for the purpose of enhancing competition), paragraph 2 of 
the Code reads as follows: 
Uses of news articles, scientific works, industrial designs, computer programs and databases 
are permitted without authorisation, but only against payment of a negotiated remuneration, 
and to the extent justified by the purpose of the use, provided that: (i) the use is 
indispensable to compete on a derivative market; (ii) the owner of the copyright in the work 
has refused to license the use on reasonable terms, leading to the elimination of competition 
in the relevant market and (iii) the use does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the owner of the copyright in the work. 
Id. at 126. 
175. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, Bundesgesetzblatt [BHBI] at 9, 24(2) 
(Ger.). 
176. CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROPR. INTELL.] art. L. 613–15  
(Fr.), translation available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/fr/fr467en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HD7H-G9BP]. 
177. Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on 
the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 19–20 (EC). 
178. See the wording of Article 31 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
179. For such a proposal in the field of incremental creations such as software, see Reto  
M. Hilty & Christophe Geiger, Patenting Software? A Judicial and Socio-Economic Analysis, 36 INT’L  
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 615, 641–46 (2005). 
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2. The Creation of a New Statutory License for Creative Use 
One way to secure fair remuneration, while also avoiding the blocking effect 
of exclusivity, is through so-called “limitation-based remuneration rights,” 
otherwise referred to as “statutory licenses.”180 The use of statutory licenses to strike 
this balance between the interests of rightsholders and users has been explored in 
the U.S. context by international copyright scholar Jane Ginsburg. She notes that 
statutory licenses or privately negotiated accords within a statutory framework can 
ensure that “uses the legislator perceives to be in the public interest proceed free of 
the copyright owner’s veto, but with compensation—in other words: permitted-
but-paid.”181 The author however restricts the use of statutory licenses to what she 
calls “distributive uses” (non-creative reuse of copyrighted works), as opposed to 
“productive uses.”182 For this second category of uses, fair use “for free” should 
still be available. 
This approach has long been established in many European countries for 
certain limitations. A prominent example is in private copy exceptions or 
reproductions for educational and research purposes.183 In the U.S. Copyright Act, 
there is a provision providing for a similar solution in relation to musical works.184 
This essentially allows for recording artists to record “covers” of musical works 
previously written and released by another artist.185 Section 115 codifies the 
requirement of compulsory mechanical licenses for reproduction of musical 
works.186 However, the extent to which the subsequent musician can creatively alter 
the work is questionable. Section 115(a)(2) states that a “compulsory license 
includes the privilege of making a musical arrangement of the work to the extent 
necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the performance 
involved, but the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental character 
of the work, and shall not be subject to protection as a derivative work under this title, 
except with the express consent of the copyright owner.”187 Nonetheless, it shows 
that the spirit of statutory licenses to manage the interests of rightsholders and 
subsequent creative uses is already present in the United States. 
 
180. To reiterate the distinction made above, although the terms “statutory license” and 
“compulsory license” are often used interchangeably in legal writings, for the purpose of this piece, 
“compulsory licenses” refer to those that require a court to order them. As a difference, in the case of 
statutory license, the use is permitted upfront by the statute (and not downstream by a judge) but needs 
to be remunerated. 
181. Ginsburg, supra note 170. 
182. Id. at 1383. 
183. See, e.g., Christophe Geiger & Oleksandr Bulayenko, General Report: Scope and Enforcement 
Tools to Ensure Remuneration, in REMUNERATION FOR THE USE OF WORKS: EXCLUSIVITY VS. OTHER 
APPROACHES 112 (Silke von Lewinski ed., 2017); Jane C. Ginsburg, supra note 170, at 1417–25. 
184. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012). 
185. See generally JULIE E. COHEN, LYDIA PALLAS LOREN, RUTH L. OKEDIJI & MAUREEN  
A. O’ROURKE, COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 413–14 (4th ed. 2015). 
186. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012). 
187. Id. § 115(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
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Copyright is a balancing act between owners and users, between initial and 
subsequent creators. As shown, limitations (remunerated or not) are used to foster 
creativity. It is therefore inappropriate to start with the assumption that there is 
some form of harm to the rightsholder when a limitation or statutory license is 
engaged. In light of what has been argued previously, it can be considered 
misleading when the European legislator speaks of “compensation” and not of 
“remuneration” in connection with copyright limitations and the right of creators 
to be paid for these permitted uses.188 Recital 35 of the InfoSoc Directive, for 
example, reads: “In certain cases of exceptions or limitations, rightsholders should 
receive fair compensation to compensate them adequately for the use made of their 
protected works or other subject-matter.”189 The Advocate General Trstenjak’s 
position is thus convincing when in her opinion in the Padawan case190 she stresses 
that: 
[t]he right to “fair compensation” within the meaning of Article 5(2)(b) of 
Directive 2001/29 . . . primarily has the character of a reward. This is 
apparent from the first sentence of recital 10, pursuant to which if authors 
or performers are to continue their creative and artistic work, they have to 
receive an ‘appropriate reward’ for the use of their work. Recital 35 makes 
clear that ‘fair compensation’ should also be classified in this category of 
rewards, where it is stated that in certain cases of exceptions or limitations, 
rightholders should receive fair compensation to compensate them 
adequately for the use made of their protected works or other subject-
matter. On the other hand, legal categorisation of the legal concept of ‘fair 
compensation’ as a straightforward claim for damages, as the referring 
court apparently assumes, may not readily be confirmed.191 
Unfortunately, the European Court of Justice did not follow the Advocate 
General’s line of reasoning, and held that “fair compensation must be regarded as 
recompense for the harm suffered by the author,” and that the level of 
compensation is linked to the harm caused.192 This “compensation” or “indemnity” 
terminology seems to imply some kind of damage which has to be redressed. Given 
 
188. For more on this issue, see Geiger & Schönherr, supra note 3; Geiger & Schönherr, supra 
note 4. 
189. Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 
2001 O.J. (L 167) 13, recital 35 [hereinafter Harmonisation Directive] (emphasis added). The French 
wording is very similar: “Dans le cas de certaines exceptions ou limitations, les titulaires de droits 
doivent recevoir une compensation équitable afin de les indemniser de manière adéquate pour l’utilisation 
faite de leurs œuvres ou autres objets protégés” (emphasis added) (quoting French version), 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0462&from=FR 
[https://perma.cc/4TTE-28UC]. 
190. Case C-467/08, Padawan SL v Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España 
(SGAE), 2010 E.C.R. I-10055 (AG Trstenjak opinion). 
191. Id. §§ 79, 80 (emphasis added); see also Harmonisation Directive, supra note 189, at 11. 
192. Case C-467/08, Padawan SL, 2010 E.C.R. I-10055, § 40. 
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the above discussion, however, these terms appear to be inaccurate.193 In the 
interest of the primary authors searching for efficient and pragmatic solutions to 
generate financial gain from the use of their works, one would rather speak of 
“remuneration” instead of “compensation.” Hence, there would be remuneration 
by way of a license and remuneration through a copyright limitation. 
Terminologically, it would thus be preferable to use the term “limitation-based 
remuneration rights” than the more established and often misleading term “levies.” 
The same can be said about the economically-oriented term “liability rule,” often 
used to describe the kinds of legal situations where, instead of a possibility to forbid, 
the right owner only gets some monetary reward for the use of their works, as the 
notion of liability implies a prejudice that needs to be compensated.194 
The term “statutory license,” which is often used for limitations coupled with 
a right to receive fair remuneration, seems more suitable to express the concept of 
remuneration for the use of a copyrighted work, although the term is itself not 
entirely satisfying, as it implies that there is an exclusive right and that the permission 
to use is given only by the law. It could as well be argued that the exclusive right is 
absent in those cases but that the legislator considers that the use should be 
remunerated as a policy option to secure creators’ interests. In fact, copyright 
limitations are to be understood as limits to the exclusive right of the authors, 
beyond which they may not have any control over their work anymore.195 
Therefore, it seems that it would be better to speak of limitations with remuneration 
(or “limitation-based remuneration claims”) and limitations without remuneration. 
 
193. In this sense, see also MARTIN KRETSCHMER, PRIVATE COPYING AND FAIR 
COMPENSATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF COPYRIGHT LEVIES IN EUROPE 1 n.1 (2011) 
(“deplor[ing] the incoherence of the EU concept of fair compensation based on harm”). 
194. See Annette Kur & Jens Schovsbo, Expropriation or Fair Game for All? The Gradual 
Dismantling of the IP Exclusivity Paradigm, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD 
TRADE SYSTEM: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF TRIPS 408, 409 (Annette Kur & Marianne Levin eds., 
2011) (defining liability rules as a “legal structure permitting third parties to undertake certain actions 
without prior permission, provided that they pay compensation for the trespass.”). On this issue more 
generally, see the seminal article by Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (reminding that the 
liability paradigm was primarily developed in the context of tort law). For examples of application  
of liability rules to the intellectual property domain, see Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88  
TEX. L. REV. 253 (2009); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An 
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: 
Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Jerome  
H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries: 
Application to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 337 (Keith E. Maskus & 
Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005); Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging 
Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000). 
195. To refer to an image we used in earlier writings, “intellectual property rights constitute 
islands of exclusivity in an ocean of liberty.” Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the 
Coherence of Intellectual Property Law?, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 268, 272 
(2004). Therefore, “the scope of intellectual property . . . must be deemed only to extend to its limits, 
whether explicit or implicit. Outside this scope, one is ‘outside the monopoly,’ with the result that the 
right holder cannot exercise any control whatsoever.” Id. 
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B. Feasibility 
1. Implementation and Potential Obstacles 
Having limitation-based remuneration for rightsholders from creative uses is 
clearly both achievable and practical. First, it is a model that has already been 
adopted by several countries with respect to other types of exceptions and 
limitations. Second, there is evidence that centralized schemes used to remunerate 
rightsholders for private uses have been able to generate substantial funds. 
Exceptions and limitations-based remunerations are already in place in the 
copyright law of several European countries. These uses tend to be for educational, 
news reporting, or religious purposes, and to facilitate access to the disabled;196 the 
author is entitled to remuneration for the use in each case.197 What these exceptions 
all have in common is that they are aimed at serving the public interest through 
facilitating dissemination of information and the use of protected works in certain 
circumstances. In the same spirit, such limitations could also include uses for artistic 
purposes, which is very much in line with copyright’s goal of promoting freedom 
of artistic expression and cultural development, as established in Part I of this paper. 
In Europe, there has been case law favoring such an approach. In its highly 
regarded decision on July 11, 2002,198 the German Federal Supreme Court has seen 
the potential of “limitation-based remunerations” for effective protection of the 
creator. The Court interpreted extensively the limitation for press review of Article 
49 of the German Copyright Act in order to cover electronic press reviews made 
by companies for internal use. The Court’s reasoning was that a considerable part 
of the received payment would flow to the authors themselves and that a narrow 
interpretation of the limitation would thus not improve the author’s position.199 
Building upon similar reasoning, the Swiss Supreme Court, in a decision on 
June 26, 2007,200 held that the activity of a company, which commercially prepares 
and delivers electronic press reviews (so-called “press clipping and documentation 
delivery services” or “value-added information services”), is covered by limitation 
for personal use according to Article 19 of the Swiss Copyright Act, which allows 
the reproduction of a work also by third parties.201 Within the examination of 
whether this extensive interpretation of the limitation does not violate the so called 
 
196. See Geiger & Bulayenko, supra note 183; Ginsburg, supra note 170. 
197. Id. 
198. BGH July 11, 2002, “Elektronische Pressespiegel,” [2003] JZ 473, comment by T. Dreier. 
199. Christophe Geiger, Promoting Creativity through Copyright Limitations: Reflections on the 
Concept of Exclusivity in Copyright Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515, 531 (2010). 
200. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] June 26, 2007, 4C.73/2007 (Switz.). For a 
comment, see Christophe Geiger, Rethinking Copyright Limitations in the Information Society: The Swiss 
Supreme Court Leads the Way, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 943 (2008). 
201. BGer June 26, 2007, 133 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS 
[BGE] III 473 (Switz.). 
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“three-step test” of the Berne Convention (article 9.2),202 the court held: 
It cannot be assumed that the interest of the right holder is restricted in an 
unreasonable manner, if he gets a claim for remuneration instead of the 
right to prohibit the use, because both the interest of the journalists and 
those of the publishers have to be considered. With reference to the press 
review, indeed an exclusive right would perfectly serve the publisher’s 
interests, who normally owns the rights of the journalists, because then he 
can freely decide whether he wants to prevent the reproduction of the 
works or to give his approval against payment of a corresponding 
remuneration. The journalist as the author of the single article, however, 
has no interest in such an exclusive right. On the one hand, he is interested 
in his articles being available to many readers. On the other hand, he only 
makes money out of the reproductions made for the press clipping and 
documentation services if he is entitled to a remuneration.203 
If one follows this argument, it can be stated that an increased number of 
limitations—when coupled with an obligation to pay an appropriate 
remuneration—can serve the author’s interests. If one really wants to achieve 
effective copyright protection, this prospect is not to be disregarded in connection 
with the interpretation of the existing limitation system, as well as with its—due—
adaptation in the future.204 
In any case, the copyright limitation does not solely protect the remuneration 
interest of the author who has already created a work, but also the interests of the 
author during the creation process. It should not be forgotten that at this stage, the 
authors themselves are the major beneficiaries of limitations to copyright.205 Like 
journalists, artists might also want their work to gain exposure through subsequent 
commentary and use by other artists, subject to attribution and fair remuneration 
for the use. Similarly, they would not want their creative process to be hindered by 
rigid exclusive rights where they wish to create art pieces based on previous works. 
If a limitation-based remuneration scheme is in place, can sufficient funds for 
remuneration be realistically raised? Levies on private copying are one existing 
example of how substantial revenues have been generated to remunerate 
rightsholders. A WIPO study showed that between 2007 and 2012, in the thirty-two 
countries covered by the survey, approximately €550 million of private copy levies 
 
202. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 9(2), Sept. 9, 1886, 
as revised on July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (“It shall be a matter for 
legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special 
cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”). 
203. BGer June 26, 2007, 133 BGE III 473 (Switz.). 
204. Katerina Gaita & Andrew F. Christie, Principle or Compromise?: Understanding the Original 
Thinking Behind Statutory License and Levy Schemes for Private Copying (Intellectual Prop. Research  
Inst. of Austl., Working Paper No. 04/40, 2004). 
205. Geiger, supra note 73, at 532. 
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were collected per year.206 A 2011 empirical study by the UK Intellectual Property 
Office also showed that: 
following the Information Society Directive of 2001 (introducing the 
concept of ‘fair compensation’ for private copying into EU Law), total 
collection from levies on copying media and equipment in the EU tripled, 
from about €170 [million] to more than €500 [million] per annum. Levy 
schemes exist now in 22 out of 27 Member States (with only the UK, 
Ireland, Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg remaining outside).207 
These are clear examples, already in place, of how access to works is facilitated 
while providing significant remuneration to the rightsholder through a statutory 
mechanism; thus, it can empirically support the feasibility of generating adequate 
payments to the rightsholder through the limitation-based remuneration scheme.208 
If practically feasible, the implementation of a statutory license for creative 
reuse might potentially face some legal obstacles. These are twofold: (a) 
international copyright law and (b) the constitutional protection of copyright by the 
right to property, which will be considered in turn. 
a. Obligations Resulting from International Copyright Law 
Any domestic legislation implementing a “limitation-friendly” approach must 
of course comply with obligations resulting from international conventions, in 
particular with the so-called “three-step test”209 included in many international 
treaties on copyright and intellectual property.210 The three-step test requires the 
compliance of the contracting parties with a number of conditions when 
introducing limitations into their national copyright law. In order to fulfill the 
criteria, the limitation must (1) describe a certain special case; (2) not conflict with 
the normal exploitation of the work; and (3) not unreasonably prejudice the 
 
206. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY ON 
PRIVATE COPYING 11 (2014), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/1037/wipo_ 
pub_1037_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4H7-SKGE]. 
207. KRETSCHMER, supra note 193, at 7. 
208. See JOAO PEDRO QUINTAIS, COPYRIGHT IN THE AGE OF ONLINE ACCESS: 
ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEMS IN EU LAW (2017), for a detailed exploration of the 
feasibility, desirability, and legality of these remuneration systems, in particular in the context of non-
commercial online uses. 
209. See, e.g., Christophe Geiger, Daniel J. Gervais & Martin Senftleben, Understanding the 
“Three-Step Test”, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 167, 167–85 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2015) (discussing the “three-part 
test”). 
210. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 178, art. 13; Berne Convention, supra note 202, art. 16(2); 
WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 10, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65; WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty art.16(2), Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76; Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Information Society, art. 5(5), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17 [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive]; 
see also Christophe Geiger, From Berne to National Law, via the Copyright Directive: The Dangerous 
Mutations of the Three-Step Test, 29 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 486, 486 (2007). 
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legitimate interests of the author and/or the right holder.211 At the third step, a fair 
balance of interests involved is required, whereas the second step shall ensure that 
the core of copyright is not eroded. In this spirit, the normal exploitation of the 
work is interpreted by scholars as including only the economic core of copyright.212 
Understood accordingly, the protected core arguably prohibits transforming 
the exclusive right totally into a right to receive a fair remuneration, but the 
possibility of a restriction should remain if important conflicting interests of the 
general public so require. Thus, for the purposes of a normative consideration of 
the three-step test, which have been advocated by several scholars,213 it could be 
argued that the “normal” exploitation in some cases can also be achieved by 
limitation-based remuneration rights and that the exclusive right only covers the 
right to oppose the identical reproduction of the work (primary market)214 and not 
its creative reuse (derived markets).215 
 
211. Geiger et al., supra note 209. 
212. See, e.g., Martin Senftleben, Die Bedeutung der Schranken des Urheberrechts in der 
Informationsgesellschaft und Ihre Begrenzung Durch den Dreistufentest, in INTERESSENAUSGLEICH IM 
URHEBERRECHT 159, 182 (Reto M. Hilty & Alexander Peukert eds., 2004). 
213. See Martin Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual Property 
Rights? – WTO Panel Reports Shed Light on the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests in 
Patent and Trademark Law, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 407 (2006), for a 
discussion in favor of a normative approach to the second step. See also Geiger, supra note 20, at 194; 
Geiger, supra note 6. 
214. Would a limitation-based remuneration approach still be consistent with the normal 
exploitation of the exclusive right to authorize derivative works? Under Article 12 of the Berne 
Convention, authors have the exclusive right of authorizing adaptations, arrangements, and alterations 
of their works. Notably, in cases where the derivative use is done in exercise of the subsequent user’s 
freedom of artistic expression, that derivative use is hardly in economic competition, nor do 
rightsholders anticipate that they would make such uses for economic gain. The U.S. fair use cases 
above demonstrate this. See Berne Convention, supra note 202. The subsequent expression is found to 
be fair use because the fourth (market) factor determines that the later work is not a market substitute 
for the original. Hence, this limitation-based remuneration would not be in conflict with normal 
exploitation of the exclusive right to authorize derivative works when the subsequent users are 
exercising their artistic creativity without being in economic competition with the rightsholder. 
Moreover, the primary author would still receive a remuneration as a counterpart for the creative use 
due to the statutory license mechanisms. Admittedly, not much would be left of the exclusive right of 
adaptation, mainly non-creative reuses or for uses where the creative input is rather low. However, the 
strong opposing human rights to free artistic expression of the second author and the cultural function 
of copyright mandate that the exclusive right is reduced and replaced by a right of remuneration in most 
cases of creative reuse in order to avoid the blocking effect of exclusivity. 
215. See Christophe Geiger, Jonathan Griffiths & Reto M. Hilty, Declaration on a Balanced 
Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION 
L. 707, 712 (2008) (“Limitations and exceptions do not conflict with a normal exploitation of protected 
subject matter, if they are based on important competing considerations or have the effect of countering 
unreasonable restraints on competition, notably on secondary markets, particularly where adequate 
compensation is ensured, whether or not by contractual means.”); see also Christophe Geiger, Jonathan 
Griffiths & Reto M. Hilty, Towards a Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 
30 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 489 (2008). 
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b. Constitutional Property Protection 
Apart from the international three-step test, the constitutional framework for 
copyright might pose yet another challenge to a total transformation of the exclusive 
right into a limitation-based remuneration right. This is the situation in those 
countries where copyright is subsumed under the general right to property,216 which 
is the case in most European countries and seems to be the case in the United States 
too,217 even if it appears to have been less an issue in United States courts so far.218 
At the European level, it is recognized that copyright enjoys protection according 
to Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol (property) to the ECHR.219 Article 17 
paragraph 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2000 
even contains the succinct clause “intellectual property shall be protected,”220 which 
has led in the first place to abusive interpretations in the absence of any clear 
explanations of the scope of such protection.221 
 
216. Francis Yeoh, Adaptations in Music Theatre: Confronting Copyright, 26 ENT. L. REV. 119, 
119 (2015) (“The concept of copyright as ‘property’ and the ‘economic’ approach to copyright have 
ensured that the limitations to the ‘monopolistic’ rights of copyright owners are strictly interpreted.”). 
217. See e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 605 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme 
Court held in Florida Prepaid that patents are considered property within the meaning of the  
due process clause. Since patent and copyright are of a similar nature, and patent is a form of 
property . . . copyright would seem to be so too.”) (citation omitted); see also Michael A. Carrier, Cabining 
Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004). 
218. For an alternative normative frame for copyright, such as the right to culture or the right 
to freedom of expression, see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 36, art. 27; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 28, art. 15. For an 
alternative normative frame for copyright on the national level, see, for example, Czech Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 1992, art. 34(1); Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucija [Constitution] 
Oct. 25, 1992, art. 42 (Lith.); Constitución Española [CE] [Constitution] Oct. 31, 1978, art. 20 (Spain). 
For further examples of how the constitutional protection for copyright is framed under different 
domestic and supranational constitutional texts around the globe, see Geiger, supra note 41. 
219. Akdeniz v. Turkey, App. No. 20877/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014) (admissibility decision);  
Neij & Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden, App. No. 40397/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013) (admissibility decision); 
Ashby Donald & Others v. France, App. No. 36769/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013); Balan v. Moldova,  
App. No. 19247/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008); Melnychuk v. Ukraine, App. No. 28743/03,  
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (admissibility decision); Dima v. Romania, App. No. 58472/00,  
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (admissibility decision); Aral, Tekin & Aral v. Turkey, App. No. 24563/94,  
Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1998) (admissibility decision); A.D. v. Netherlands, App. No. 21962/
93, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1994) (admissibility decision). 
220. See Christophe Geiger, Intellectual “Property” After the Treaty of Lisbon: Towards a Different 
Approach in the New European Legal Order?, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 255 (2010); Jonathan Griffiths 
& Luke McDonagh, Fundamental Rights and European IP Law: The Case of Art. 17(2) of the EU Charter, 
in CONSTRUCTING EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEW 
PERSPECTIVES 75 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2013). 
221. The Community legislator has already referred to Article 17(2) when opting for a 
“maximalist” conception of IP in the European Union, with an aim to implement a “rigorous,” “more 
far-reaching” system of intellectual property protection. See, e.g., InfoSoc Directive, supra note 210, at 
10; Directive 2006/115/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
Rental Right and Lending Right and on Certain Rights Related to Copyright in the Field of Intellectual 
Property, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 28; see also Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, COM (2008) 466/3 final 
( July 16, 2008). The so-called “absolutist” logic has also influenced the case law of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union. See, e.g., Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 
E.C.R. I-6569 (holding that even certain parts of sentences may be considered a protected work);  
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On the other hand, the potential negative consequences of the property 
approach should not be overestimated, as they could largely be remedied by the 
internal limits of the constitutional right to property. Even in a moral rights or 
natural law-based understanding, the constitutional notion of property has always 
been considered a right inherently restricted by public interests. This principle of 
Sozialbindung des Eigentums (the “social bounds” of property) for the benefit of 
society is reflected in both Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR and Article 
17 paragraph 1 of the EU Charter, which provide for the possibility of restrictions 
in the common interest.222 This means that intellectual property can be limited in 
order to safeguard the public interest just like the right to physical property. This 
logic, clearly excluding an “absolutist” conception of IP, was clearly envisaged by 
the drafters of both the ECHR and the Charter223 and finds further support in the 
judicial practice of the European Courts.224 
2. Determining Fair Remuneration for the Creator of the Initial Work Creatively Reused 
The final important question that remains to be considered is how “fair 
remuneration” could, in practice, be secured. Admittedly, this is not an easy 
 
see also Christophe Geiger, Intellectual Property Shall Be Protected!? Article 17(2) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union: A Mysterious Provision with an Unclear Scope, 31  
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 113 (2009). 
222. For further discussion of a limited nature of the right to property in general and intellectual 
property in particular, see Alexander Peukert, The Fundamental Right to (Intellectual) Property and the 
Discretion of the Legislature, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 132. See also Geiger, supra note 
96. 
223. Council of Europe, Preparatory Work on Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, CDH (76) 36, Strasbourg, Aug. 13, 1976 (entertaining an idea of a 
“relative” nature of a newly introduced property paradigm as opposed to an absolute right to own 
property in a sense it was understood by Roman law). 
 Similarly, the preparatory documents of the EU Charter specify that “the guarantees laid down 
in paragraph 1 of Article 17 shall apply as appropriate to intellectual property” and that “the meaning 
and scope of Article 17 are the same as those of the right guaranteed under Article 1 of the First 
Protocol to the ECHR.” Note from the Praesidium, Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, Text of the Explanations Relating to the Complete Text of the Charter as set out in 
CHARTE 4487/00 CONVENT 50 (Brussels, 2000), 19–20. 
224. Particularly, as it concerns the CJEU, the latter has stated on numerous occasions that IP 
rights are not absolute and that a “fair balance” has to be struck between intellectual property protection 
and the other interests of fundamental importance. See Case C-580/13, Coty Germany GmbH  
v. Stadtsparkasse Magdeburg, 2015 ECLI:EU:C:2015:485 ( July 16, 2015); Case C-117/13, Technische 
Universität Darmstadt v. Eugen Ulmer KG, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2196 (Sept. 11, 2014); Case C-201/
13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132 (Sept. 3, 2014); Case C-314/12, UPC 
Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:192 (Mar. 27, 2014); 
Case T-495/11, Streng v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (PARAMETRICA), 2014 
ECLI:EU:T:2014:39 ( Jan. 30, 2014); Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten 
en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v. Netlog NV, 2012 ECLI:EU:C:2012:85 (Feb. 16, 2012); Case C-70/
10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 2011 
E.C.R. I-11959; Case T-439/04, Eurohypo AG v. European Union Intellectual Prop. Office, 2006 
E.C.R. II-01269. For a discussion of these cases, see Christophe Geiger, The Role of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union: Harmonizing, Creating and Sometimes Disrupting Copyright Law in the European 
Union, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 20. 
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question since the systems for establishing and collecting the remuneration of 
limitation-based remuneration rights diverge worldwide considerably.225 In short, 
the share of the remuneration collected to which creators are entitled can be 
established by law or through negotiation.226 In the first situation, the solutions 
might be less nuanced, as some works are more successful than others, whereas in 
the second case the right owner, not being entitled to refuse authorization, could 
still negotiate the amount of remuneration to be paid. If no solution is reached by 
the parties, a regulatory authority could step in and mediate.227 To this effect, the 
creation of an independent regulation authority such as an “[o]bservatory on access 
to copyrighted work” could be envisaged,228 on the model of some European 
competition authorities. More generally, statutorily-organized mediation is a 
regulatory option that has been underexploited so far and should gain much 
importance in the future in the debate on how to secure balanced solutions taking 
into account all interests.229 
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms to assist in determining fair 
remuneration have been sometimes proposed in similar contexts. Professor 
Ginsburg has discussed the feasibility of such an option in relation to permitted-
but-paid uses.230 If she acknowledges that ADR may still be “expensive and time 
consuming” and still includes “disparities in bargaining power,”231 she nevertheless 
concludes that this is a workable model to follow, as the bargaining disparities can 
be offset by weaker parties submitting reasonable bids and having common agents 
represent groups of weaker parties.232 
 
225. An entire conference was organized on this issue by the ALAI in 2015. The proceedings 
have been published in REMUNERATION FOR THE USE OF WORKS, EXCLUSIVITY VS. OTHER 
APPROACHES (Silke von Lewinski ed., 2017). 
226. Shaheed, supra note 167. 
227. Ginsburg, supra note 170, at 1446 (recommending the implementation of “statutorily 
facilitated bargaining between agents representing copyright owners and users, backed up by last best-
offer arbitration before the Copyright Royalty Board. Whichever method employed to set the rates for 
permitted-but-paid uses, the copyright law should ensure that authors share in any statutory or privately 
ordered remuneration scheme.”). 
228. In this spirit, a specific provision on orphan works in the Canadian copyright law permits 
anyone who wants to make use of a work and cannot locate the copyright owner to petition the 
Canadian Copyright Board for a license. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, s. 77 (Can.). 
229. Christophe Geiger, Xavier Seuba & Asako Wechs Hatanaka, Civil Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights: Public Consultation on the Efficiency of Proceedings and Accessibility of 
Measures (Ctr. for Int’l Intellectual Prop. Studies, Research Paper No. 2013-01, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2971107 [https://perma.cc/S6D4-6SG8]. 
230. Ginsburg, supra note 170, at 1441–45. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 1445. For an article in favor of using mediation to solve copyright disputes, see Asako 
Wechs Hatanaka, Mediation and Intellectual Property Law: A European and Comparative Perspective 
(Sept. 26, 2016) (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Strasbourg), https://tel.archives-
ouvertes.fr/tel-01484798/document [https://perma.cc/J2DX-BRCH]. See also Asako Wechs 
Hatanaka, Optimising Mediation for Intellectual Property Law - Perspectives from EU, French and UK 
Law, 49 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 384 (2018). 
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Another less “intrusive” alternative would be subordinating creative uses of 
copyrighted works to a system of mandatory collective administration, as this would 
not be a limitation but a way of exercise of the exclusive right, which would 
therefore be more likely to be compatible with the international three-step test.233 
In order to avoid the same blockages as with the exclusive right, the tariffs asked by 
the collecting society could also be regulated or checked by the same independent 
authority to be created. In the United States, the Harry Fox Agency, which serves 
as a centralized agency for many musical copyright owners, collects royalties for 
Section 115 mechanical licenses in reproduction of music works.234 Perhaps this 
model, even though not mandatory, could be a useful example for reference in 
designing a centralized administrative system for creative remunerated use of works. 
CONCLUSION 
Honoring the common ideology of both doctrines, copyright, as this Article 
demonstrates, may be made compatible with freedom of artistic creativity. The 
existing current system, however, leaves much to be desired in this respect; 
derivative works provide a particular challenge to any marriage of both rights, 
particularly if isolated within the preexisting internal mechanisms of copyright 
legislation. Attempts to embrace extrinsic tools to regulate the system and maintain 
balance between the rights using human rights reasoning have surely brought some 
potential relief, without solving all situations in a satisfying manner and ensuring 
sufficient predictability for creators and the public. Therefore, in this Article, the 
recourse to a statutory license for creative uses has been proposed and its feasibility 
 
233.  CARINE BERNAULT & AUDREY LEBOIS, PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING AND LITERARY 
AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY: A FEASIBILITY STUDY REGARDING A SYSTEM OF COMPENSATION FOR 
THE EXCHANGE OF WORKS VIA THE INTERNET (2005), http://privatkopie.net/files/Feasibility-
Study-p2p-acs_Nantes.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6C2-U7HC]; P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ &  
RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS  
AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT: FINAL REPORT 19 (2008), https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/
download/limitations_exceptions_copyright.pdf [https://perma.cc/V46F-S74D] (“Although the 
practical effect of such a rule is similar to that of a statutory or compulsory license (providing for a right 
of remuneration), it is technically not a limitation, since the exclusive economic right remains intact and 
can still be enforced on behalf of right holders by designated collective societies.”); Christophe Geiger, 
The Role of the Three-Step Test in the Adaptation of Copyright Law to the Information Society,  
E-COPYRIGHT BULL., Jan.–Mar. 2007, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001578/
157848e.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4YA-8F6F]; Silke von Lewinski, Mandatory Collective Administration 
of Exclusive Rights – A Case Study on Its Compatibility with International and EC Copyright  
Law, E-COPYRIGHT BULL., Jan.–Mar. 2004, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001396/
139656e.pdf [https://perma.cc/842D-ZSC2]; cf. PHILIPPE AIGRAIN ET AL., SHARING: CULTURE AND 
THE ECONOMY IN THE INTERNET AGE 59–137 (2012); WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: 
TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004); ALAIN MODOT  
ET AL., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE “CONTENT FLAT-RATE”: A SOLUTION TO ILLEGAL  
FILE-SHARING? (2011), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2011/ 
460058/IPOL-CULT_ET(2011)460058_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NYX-P97T]; Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-To-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1 (2003). 
234. COHEN ET AL., supra note 185, at 414. 
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assessed. The conclusion is that such a limitation-based system is a workable option, 
provided that a fair remuneration is secured to the original creators in case of 
commercial exploitation of the derivative work. This framework could be 
guaranteed through the implementation of an independent regulation authority or 
a Copyright council,235 which could check that access is granted at a fair price, taking 
into account the specificity of the work in question, such as the potential market 
for the derivative work, the fame of the original creator or work used, etc.236 
Looking ahead, and maybe more fundamentally, there might be a need in the 
future to reconsider and reshape copyright as an “access right,” meaning a right to 
grant access (and not to hinder it), as a right to say “yes” rather than a right to say 
“no,” as an inclusive right rather than an exclusive right.237 Such a rethinking of the 
legislative framework has nothing to do with an anti-copyright position, as it is 
sometimes portrayed by those reluctant to reform. In fact, in current discussions on 
the future of copyright law, anyone questioning the functioning of the current 
system and bringing “access” arguments forward immediately risks being accused 
of being a supporter of greedy “pirates” who are claiming broad and free access on 
the Internet, stealing the bread out of the mouth of poor creators.238 Such 
caricatures only serve those who have an interest in the status quo and are thus 
reluctant to any reform that could diminish their control and domination over the 
copyright system. It has to be recalled: claiming access in copyright law means not 
 
235. This idea of Copyright Council in the EU has been recently developed by Franciska 
Schönherr in her Ph.D. thesis defended at the CEIPI/University of Strasbourg on October, 3  
2017. Franciska Schönherr, The Construction of an EU Copyright Law, Towards a Balanced 
Institutional and Legal Framework (Oct. 10, 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Strasbourg) 
(on file with author). Such an EU Copyright council would allow a more structured, institutionalized 
dialogue between different stakeholder groups and the institutions and safeguard, on the model of some 
copyright councils already implemented at national level, that access to copyrighted work is secured at 
a fair price; it would ensure the legitimacy of copyright whilst protecting freedom of expression and the 
public interest. 
236. This would allow adapting the remuneration on a case-by-case basis. For example, the film 
adaptation of a very famous novel such as Harry Potter would lead to a higher remuneration than the 
one of an unknown work, since the fame of the original work is likely to lead to a bigger market and 
significant revenues. Likewise, the adaptation of Harry Potter for a theatre play in Polish would lead to 
a significantly lower remuneration than if the play were in English and played on Broadway, and 
possibly broadcast afterwards to the entire world. 
237. Séverine Dusollier, Inclusivity in Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES: IS IP A LEX SPECIALIS? 101 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2015); 
Christophe Geiger, Copyright as an Access Right, Securing Cultural Participation Through the Protection 
of Creators’ Interests, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? 73 (Rebecca Giblin & 
Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2016). 
238. Indeed, as rightly noted by Reto M. Hilty, “an enhancement of copyright protection 
scarcely helps the creators of the works, but rather burdens the consumers,” because “the borderline 
of conflicting interests runs not so much between creators and consumers as greatly emphasized by the 
traditional perception of copyright, . . . [but] arises from the fact that the exploiting copyright industry 
wants to optimise its profits by all the possible means they can deploy.” Reto M. Hilty, Five Lessons 
About Copyright in the Information Society: Reaction of the Scientific Community to Over-Protection and 
What Policy Makers Should Learn, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 103, 132–33 (2005). 
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that the access should be for free, but that it should be possible under fair conditions 
and that it should not block future creativity.239 
 
239. See Christophe Geiger, The Future of Copyright in Europe: Striking a Fair Balance Between 
Protection and Access to Information, 1 INTELL. PROP. Q. 1, 1–2 (2010); Francis Gurry, Developments in 
the International Intellectual Property System, in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM IN A TIME OF 
CHANGE: EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 57, 61–62 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2016) 
(underlining that the role of copyright is “finding a balance between all the competing interests that 
surround the act of cultural creation. On the one hand, there are the interests of the creators, who 
derive their economic existence through the restriction on access that copyright entails. On the other 
hand, there are the interests of society and the general public. Access is the reason for which we are 
interested in cultural production” (emphasis added).). 
